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THE EFFECTS OF OUTSIDE INCOME ON HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR: THE CASE OF 
REMITTANCES IN JAMAICA 
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Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace 
Major Department: Economics 
 
Remittances from individuals not residing in the home significantly affect recipient 
households’ behavior.  Using data from the Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions and the 
Jamaican Labor Force Survey for years 2001-2007, this dissertation aims to explore some of the 
most significant effects of remittances, namely effects on labor market participation and 
household expenditures.  Jamaica’s proximity to the United States and Canada coupled with 
Jamaica’s diaspora of educated individuals shapes an economy largely dependent on remittances.  
The country, therefore, provides an interesting and exciting case study for examining the effects 
of remittances.   
 
 
xiii 
 
In the first essay, we investigate whether remittances alter the labor market behavior of 
married women (or those in long-term relationships) in remittance-receiving households located 
in Jamaica.  As is often the case in labor supply studies, it is important to identify key variables 
that are likely endogenous in the model.  For purposes of this research, endogenous variables 
include remittances, the wife’s education, and wages.  We instrument both when predicting labor 
market participation and hours worked.  Unlike other studies which find the income effect of 
remittances on household behavior results in increased leisure, we find that after instrumenting 
for remittances, the outside income has no significant effect on the supply of labor, either in 
terms of hours worked or participation. 
The second paper assesses the extent that remittances alter the consumption pattern of 
recipient households in Jamaica.  Classical theory predicts that total income and not income 
sources affects household consumption decisions, but developments in behavioral economics 
suggest the contrary.  The disaggregation of both income streams and consumption expenditures 
as reported in the Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions provide us with unique insight into 
household behavior and in particular, spending on items such as food, schooling, and vices. 
Using Engel curve estimation and the two-part fractional response models, we find that the 
source of the income significantly affects the shares of income spent in specific consumption 
categories.  Recipients, for example, generally spend larger shares of their income on schooling 
and home production and less at the grocery store.  These findings suggest important 
implications should government look to tax or restrict the flow of remittances. 
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Dissertation Introduction 
Remittances are a major part of many economies in the developing world.  Hundreds of 
billions of dollars flow from developed to less developed countries, and in some instances, 
comprise as much as a third of total GDP in small countries such as Haiti.  Although per capita 
receipt of remittances is smaller for large countries, India and China are among the largest 
recipients of gross remittances, with combined receipts exceeding $100 billion (Ratha, 
Mohapatra, & Silwal, 2010).  The significance of remittances is so great that a number of 
institutions are actively engaged in research on this flow of money.   
The World Bank, for example, recently created the database, Remittance Prices 
Worldwide.  In an effort to improve information about the costs of sending remittances to and 
from various countries, a group of researchers tracks the costs of sending money through the 
major channels in which formal remittances flow.  Costs of sending remittances are high for a 
variety of reasons, and the World Bank estimates that a five percent reduction in these fees 
would place approximately $16 billion more in the hands of recipients 
(http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/About-Us, accessed on June 11, 2011). 
As recently as 2009, there was a Global Forum on Remittances, where speakers included 
the chair of the G8 Global Remittances Working Group.  The G8, in discussing remittances and 
the costs for migrant workers, has suggested that reducing the costs of sending remittances could 
encourage greater entrepreneurial efforts in the developing world. 
There is little doubt as to the importance of remittances for developing countries, but 
much of the discussion on the larger stage has centered on macroeconomic factors and effects.  
In this dissertation, we look at the effects of remittances on household level decisions. 
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This dissertation consists of two chapters, each dealing with the effects of receiving 
remittances.  The first essay studies the effect of remittances on labor market behavior, while the 
second essay analyzes the extent to which remittance income alters households’ expense 
allocations.  In both essays, endogeneity of remittances may be caused by either missing 
variables affecting both remittances and labor supply (and consumption patterns) or from reverse 
causality where labor (and consumption) decisions may affect remittance receipts.  Identifying a 
suitable instrument for remittances was not an easy task.  After experimenting with several 
possible instruments, examining first-stage results, and conducting additional post-estimation 
tests of the instrument, we concluded that district level average remittances for other households 
in the district is the strongest instrument.  The idea behind this instrument is that district level 
remittances are not expected to have a direct effect on wife’s labor market activities or on 
consumption patterns of the household.   
To address our research questions of how remittances affect labor supply and household 
expenditure, we use data from two sources.  First, the Jamaican Labor Force Survey (LFS) 
collects detailed labor market data on each member of the surveyed households. This survey is 
divided into three sections to accommodate three groups of respondents, the employed, the 
unemployed, and the discouraged workers or those opting not to participate in the labor market.   
For the employed, questions about wage and hours worked are most significant for the study at 
hand.   
Additional variables are from the Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions (SLC), including 
annual receipt of remittances.  Total remittances received is the key variable in the labor essay, 
while remittances as a share of total income is the focus in the second essay.    Using share of 
total income  is common in Engel curve analyses when the source of income is thought to be 
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important (Hawkins & Wallace, 2006; Levin, 1998).  Results for both studies, labor and 
consumption, offer new insight into the remittance discussion. 
   With respect to the effect of remittances on the labor supply,  we first analyze the 
decision of married women to participate in the labor market and their reported hours of work 
conditional on participation.  We incorporate methods to account for selection and endogeneity, 
namely instrumental Tobit models for hours worked and instrumental probit models for 
participation.  Previous research generally finds that remittances decrease labor participation 
while not having an effect on hours worked.  I, however, conclude that the effects of remittances 
vary based on gender and marital status, and that for some groups, such as married women, 
remittances have no significant effect on labor market participation or hours worked.  For single 
men, the receipt of remittances decreases labor force participation by almost eight percentage 
points.  In the population as a whole, we might see the small decline in labor force participation, 
but this chapter emphasizes that this effect is not equally expected across all groups of people.   
In the second chapter, we analyze the effect of remittances on allocation decisions of the 
household, specifically focusing on the budget shares spent on various consumption goods 
including education, food, and utilities, among others.  For the regression analyses, we use a two-
part fractional logit model with Tobit-like decomposition of the marginal effects (McDonald & 
Moffitt, 1980; Ramalho & Da Silva, 2009). We use an IV two-step procedure to account for the 
endogeneity of remittances, as described in Wooldridge (2010 p. 753). Then, we calculate total 
partial effects that combine information from the two parts.  As was the case in the earlier paper, 
there is reason to suspect that remittances are endogenous, and therefore, we compare results 
when remittances are assumed as exogenous with those when remittances are treated as 
endogenous.  For some budget shares, the treatment of remittances as endogenous does not 
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change significance or direction, but for others, there are significant changes when remittances 
are treated as endogenous.   
Included in these models is a control for the households’ total expenditures.  When 
remittances significantly affect budget shares in the presence of this control, this suggests that 
remittances, as a source of income, matter and refutes claims of income fungibility across 
income types.  
Regardless of how the model is specified, increases in remittances increase home 
production, an interesting finding in light of the lack of significance in the labor chapter.  It 
might be the case that the receipt of remittances decreases labor market participation (at least for 
single males), and these individuals replace formal labor with farming and other household 
chores.  Remittances are also expected to increase expenditures on luxury items, such as 
purchasing prepared food from restaurants and vendors and using professional salon services. 
When remittances are treated as exogenous, education expenditure is positively associated with 
remittances receipts. On the other hand, participation and conditional amounts spent on grocery 
store purchases and water bills are negatively related to remittance reliance.   
The effect of remittances on one expenditure category changes significantly between the 
exogenous and endogenous models.  When remittances are assumed exogenous, the effect on 
vices is generally negative.  Once we treat remittances as endogenous, participation in this 
category (i.e. reporting a positive value) is now positively affected by remittances. 
 In conclusion, we find that receipt of remittances has a more significant effect on how 
households spend money, but a smaller effect on labor market decisions for most demographic 
groups.  This is an important contribution to current literature for a variety of reasons.  The G8 
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discusses the importance of remittances for entrepreneurial efforts, and while this cannot be 
proven with this data, there is some evidence worth further exploration.  We find, for example, 
that single men in particular, are less likely to participate in the formal labor market.  We also 
find increased home production.  It could be that these individuals use remittances to help 
support small businesses such as farming that are captured in home production but not 
necessarily reported as formal employment. 
 The micro-level effect of remittances for the welfare of recipient households is not one 
we should ignore.  Further research on remittances, continuing to break apart demographic 
groups, and additional exploration of the endogeneity of remittances are all steps for future 
research, important as international institutions continue to examine the costs and importance of 
this substantial flow of funding. 
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Chapter One: Labor Market Effects Of Foreign Remittances 
Labor supply and the way it responds to changes in variables such as income and taxation 
are among the most researched subjects in economics. This is not surprising given the central 
role which labor plays in Classical, Neoclassical, and Keynesian schools of thought.  In this 
essay, we examine how the supply of labor of females in long-term relationships is affected by 
the receipt of remittances, where remittances refer to monetary transfers from migrants to 
relatives in their country of origin.  Such transfers may be international, as in the case of 
remittance flows from Jamaicans in the United States to relatives residing in Jamaica, or internal, 
as in the case of a household member who has relocated to a major city in search of employment 
and regularly remits funds to family remaining in their hometown.  Although previous research 
has examined the effect of remittances on labor supply in the developing country context 
(Acosta, 2006; Bussolo & Medvedev, 2007; Kim, 2007), this paper is among the few that 
examines multiple years of data for Jamaica and treats remittances as an endogenous variable. 
This essay focuses specifically on the labor supply of women in long-term relationships, 
either married or in common-law unions, for several reasons.  First, although not directly 
comparable to other studies on labor supply in Jamaica, the approach is similar to major labor 
supply studies in the United States  Secondly, married women or those in long-term relationships 
may be more likely to receive remittances from spouses living abroad.  There is an element of 
sacrifice that occurs which differs from households receiving remittances from a cousin, friend, 
or anyone else outside of the long-term relationship.  Results might differ, therefore, based on the 
sender of these remittances. 
Remittances and immigration typically follow a straightforward pattern.  Individuals 
move from less developed areas to places with greater economic opportunity, obtain 
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employment, and send remittances to their native communities. For Jamaica, the case presented 
in this essay, these two trends are extremely pronounced. The World Bank estimates that 80 
percent of Jamaica’s tertiary graduates reside abroad, and the country consistently ranks among 
the top five countries in per capita remittance receipts (Seaga, 2006).
1
  The combination of high 
migration and high per capita remittances establishes Jamaica as a good case study for research 
on the effects of remittances on labor supply. 
For many developing countries, remittances contribute significantly to foreign cash 
inflow.  During prosperous times in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, such as the 
2001-2004 time period included in this study, remittances remain on a growth trajectory.   The 
current global economic downturn, however, may negatively affect remittances, and thus a better 
understanding of the relationship between remittances and labor supply in developing countries 
is important in understanding the total effect of drops in remittances to these already struggling 
economies.
2
  To reiterate, this first study examines the relationship between remittances and 
labor supply in good economic times, but it would be a natural expansion of the current study to 
look at remittance effects during both boom and bust economic times once more recent data 
become available.   
  In order for Jamaica to advance economically, it must establish and maintain a well-
functioning labor market that provides proper incentives for workers.  If remittances are seen as 
an additional source of income, then this may increase reservation wages, providing a 
                                                          
1
 In the Jamaican Gleaner article, dated January 8, 2006. 
2
 For example, suppose remittances decrease labor supply.  In a global recession, if remittances fall, there may be 
an increase in the labor supply in developing countries, thus increasing unemployment and further depressing 
wages. 
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disincentive to work in Jamaica and reduce the observed supply of labor in recipient countries 
(Ariola, 2008; Kim, 2007).  
It is plausible that the receipt of remittances affects decisions in addition to labor supply. 
Other variables that might be affected by remittance receipts include but are not limited to 
consumption (Davies, Easaw, & Ghoshray, 2009), the focus in essay two of this dissertation, as 
well as the trade balance, schooling and human capital development, home production, economic 
development, poverty and income inequality.  And while this paper uses a microeconomic lens to 
study remittances, the view of remittances as payments that flow across international borders 
also implies that these micro-economic behaviors may have implications on macro-economic 
outcomes (Abdih, Chami, Dagher, & Montiel, 2008; Acosta, Fajnzylber, & Lopez, 2007; Chami, 
Fullenkamp, & Jajah, 2003; Rapoport & Docquier, 2006).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides 
background information on the flows of remittances as well as the motivations for this study and 
our major contributions. We present a review of the relevant literature in the next section, 
followed by a discussion of the theory of remittances and labor. Next, we present the 
methodology used and empirical issues encountered. We then give a summary and discussion of 
the data, followed by results and the conclusion. 
Background 
Before presenting labor theory, it is important to first understand the context of 
remittances and Jamaica.  One of the driving forces behind the trends of migration and 
remittances is the economic welfare of households. Persons leave or are encouraged to leave if 
the household thinks that this will increase overall welfare relative to the expected level had that 
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person instead participated in the local labor market. Differing economic conditions in urban and 
rural areas, as well as between developing and developed countries, are anectdotally behind the 
widescale migration of labor. This migration is often followed by remittances in the short and 
long-run, and circular migration
3
 in the long-run. The revolving cycle of migration is expected to 
pesist as long as regional economic disparities continue.  
For developing countries, the benefits of this migration cycle are several fold.  First, the 
remittances themselves add to the domestic economy.  Second, migrants may return with new 
skills and financial resources which in time may benefit other local residents who either learn 
from these returning residents or gain employment by working with them.  Finally, migration of 
some workers may increase the wages of those remaining in the developing county if the drop in 
the supply of labor in the home country is significant.
4,5
  
While there are benefits to the developing countries from the migration and remittance 
cycle, developed countries, too, may benefit.  For example, the introduction of immigrant 
workers adds to the  diversity of the labor market and provides workers willing to accept lower 
wages than that required by residents. There may be some ambiguity as to whether immigrants 
supress wages and employment opportunites for natives in the developed country, but empirical 
findings suggest the opposite is true – that immigrants may have a positive or no effect on 
natives’ job prospects (Card, 2005).  
                                                          
3
 Circular migration refers to the return of migrants to their countries of origin with enhanced skills, experiences, 
and earnings garnered in the host countries.  Although not a new concept, there is growing research in this area. 
4
 The expected change in wages depends upon the elasticity of labor supply and migration relative to the 
remaining labor supply.  For lower skilled jobs in Jamaica, migration may not have a significant effect, but given 
that 80 percent of Jamaicans with tertiary degrees move abroad, the effect on skilled wages may be more 
significant.  
5
 The effect of increased wages for some workers could also be a positive or negative for the developing country.  
Wage increases may reduce poverty but could be negative in that they cause inflation, increase businesses’ labor 
costs, and reduce the competitiveness of the country’s firms in the global economy. 
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To better understand the migration and remmittance cycle, specifically in Jamaica, a 
quick overview of the immigration process is necessary.  Most individuals emigrating from 
Jamaica for the purpose of employment usually file for permanent residency or work visas in one 
of three countries, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.  When applying for 
permits, the burden of proof is on the applicant to assure the local Embassies (of the United 
States and Canada) and high commission (of the United Kingdom) that they have sufficient 
economic and social ties and will not be a burden to the host economy.  This process can be 
lengthy and expensive, evidence that the perceived benefits are great. 
In Jamaica, remittances are often sent through remittance transfer companies, namely, 
Western Union, Jamaica National Building Society, MoneyGram, Quick Cash, Victoria Mutual 
Building Society, Money Express and Sun Money.  Together, these firms accounted for 
approximately 77 percent of remittance flows accounted for in 2005. Another 16 percent of 
remittances are sent via traditional commercial banks, a number likely the result of many 
Jamaicans lacking formal bank accounts.  Only 2 percent of recipients report receiving 
remittances through the postal service, and a surprisingly low 4 percent report receipts via 
friends or relatives who traveled abroad (Focal Report, 2006).  The last of these numbers, 
remittances through mail or travelling friends and family, may be the most understated, as there 
is no official record of these funds by the private or public sectors.  
In addition to financial remittances, individuals abroad may send in-kind remittances 
consisting of clothing, house wares, and school supplies, among other items.  The in-kind 
transfers are made either through shipment containers called barrels or friends and relatives who 
travel abroad.  
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A survey by the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) estimates the total 
value of cash and in-kind remittances in Jamaica in 2005.  A sample of 766 survey respondents 
were asked to report the average amount of remittances typically received on a single occasion 
and the frequency with which they received remittances.  FOCAL reports the modal category of 
cash remittances as 6,000-10,000 Jamaican dollars (or $100-$161 United States dollars), selected 
by thirty percent of respondents, and the modal frequency of receipts as once per month (twenty-
four percent of respondents).  Of the 766 respondents, 43 percent reported they had received at 
least one barrel of goods sent from abroad.  When asked the value of the contents, almost forty 
percent did not know or could not recall.  Of those who specified a range, most indicated the 
value exceeded 30,000 Jamaican or $500 United States dollars   
Remittances to Jamaica exceed government assistance, and the lack of government 
assistance may in some respects explain the significant flow of remittances.  In the next section, 
we provide more background on Jamaica by briefly discussing the welfare system. 
Welfare Programs in Jamaica 
 A little background on the recent history of Jamaica is relevant to understand some of the 
current welfare programs in place. From the end of the Second World War through the 1960s, 
Jamaica was a booming country growing at a steady pace of 4 percent per year (Grosh, 1992). 
The 1970s brought a drastic change of fortunes, with per capita GDP declining 18 percent 
between 1972 and 1980, likely the result of oil price shocks, political upheavals, and social 
reforms.  To help those in need, Jamaica initially provided food directly to households, but in 
1984, the government replaced general food subsidies with the food stamp program. In 2001, the 
government overhauled the welfare system and implemented the Program of Advancement 
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through Health and Education (PATH). This replaced three existing income transfer programs, 
the Food Stamps Program, the Poor Relief Program, and the Public Assistance Program.
6
 PATH 
intends to address poverty both currently through income transfers and in the future by 
encouraging poor households to invest in the education and health of their children (Levy & 
Ohls, 2007).  
Potential PATH participants must register in order to be considered for involvement.  In 
the selection process, all applicants are assigned scores based on need, and those with the lowest 
scores are accepted. Welfare recipients receive a check in the mail with continued receipt 
contingent upon proof the child is attending school and receiving regular wellness checks at 
health centers. This program, however, may still not be reaching the poorest households if they 
fail to register, which is possible given transportation costs and lack of information. Whether 
remittances flow to the same households receiving PATH, making the two complements, or to 
households not receiving PATH, making them substitutes, is an unanswered question. As of 
2007, 285,000 persons registered for PATH funds, of which 180,000 received monthly aid (Levy 
& Ohls, 2007).  The difference between the number receiving funds and those registered, 
coupled with the possibility that some needy households are not even registered, leaves a 
significant number of people in need of additional income sources such as remittances. 
Motivation 
  Relative to average earned income and government welfare in Jamaica, remittances are a 
significant component of income for a number of Jamaican households, motivating the 
importance of studying the effects of remittances on recipients’ behavior.  As seen in Figure 1, 
real remittances grew between 2001 and 2006 before leveling off through 2008 and falling 
                                                          
6
 As of 2002 the Survey of Living Conditions was adjusted to reflect this change in the programs. 
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slightly in 2009, likely the result of the global recession.  As a percentage of GDP, aggregated 
remittances consistently comprised more than 10 percent since 2001 and more than 14 percent 
for the last 5 years.  
Figure 1  
Remittance trends 
 
Source: Bank of Jamaica (www.boj.gov.jm, accessed on June 23, 2011) 
This study is also motivated by the state of the labor market in Jamaica. As Figure 2 
shows, Jamaica has one of the largest unemployment rates in the Caribbean region, with an 
urban unemployment rate of 19.4 percent for the period 1980-2000 (James Heckman & Pages, 
2003).  More recent data indicate that higher than average unemployment in Jamaica persists.   
Although the rate equaled the Caribbean and Latin American average in 2003, the decline 
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between 2003 and 2006 in Jamaica fell short of the region’s decline, leaving Jamaica with a rate 
above ten percent while the rest of the region averaged nine percent.  Jamaica receives greater 
remittances both in terms of absolute and per capita terms than other Caribbean countries, again 
suggesting a link between remittances and labor behavior.  
Figure 2 
 Trends in Unemployment 
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics
7
 (2009) 
A third reason for studying remittances in Jamaica is the “barrel children” phenomenon.  
The term describes families in which the parents migrate and remit goods for the children and 
other family members, often in large barrels through freight services.  Items shipped are often 
                                                          
7 Countries included are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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those unavailable in local markets or priced significantly higher in Jamaica than comparative 
costs in the parents’ host countries. Many Jamaicans believe, however, that the migration of 
parents from Jamaica has resulted in detrimental side effects for Jamaica, with the absence of 
parents adversely affecting children’s schooling and behavior. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
this is not a far-fetched causal relationship, and some empirical research suggests negative 
effects on children (Lu & Treiman, 2005).   This negative effect, however, disappears once 
positive amounts of remittances are received by those caring for the children.   A better 
understanding of the labor impact of remittances may provide information that is useful in 
analyzing the barrel children issue in further research. 
 The final motivation for this research arises from an interest in studying non-labor 
income in a developing country, a topic often limited by the availability of data.    Examples of 
non-labor income include interest on savings, capital gains, welfare payments from the 
government, and as discussed thus far, remittances.  Arguably, it is welfare payments from the 
government that are most analogous to remittances.  While substantial research exists on the 
effect of non-labor income on household labor supply in developed countries, less is known 
about this relationship for households in less developed countries such as Jamaica. 
 Overall, the issue of how remittances affect labor supply is important for any developing 
country to understand.  Changes in policies that either ease or restrict the flow of remittances 
could have substantial effects on labor markets and expenditures in the recipient countries.  Such 
changes could include taxing remittances similarly to income in an attempt to make the tax 
system more horizontally equitable.   
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Main Contributions 
The sheer magnitude of remittance flows to a small developing country such as Jamaica, 
combined with the availability of data, makes Jamaica a reasonable choice for the study of 
remittances, as demonstrated by its frequent selection by scholars  (Alleyne, Kirton, McLeod, & 
Fiqueroa, 2008; Bussolo & Medvedev, 2007; Kim, 2007; Kirton, 2005). Although the country of 
Jamaica is not a unique choice, the theory applied and empirical methods selected in this essay, 
as described in more detail below, offer a new perspective on the relationship between 
remittances and labor supply. 
The main contributions of this paper are to provide an update of the influence of 
remittances on the labor market in the context of a small developing country heavily reliant on 
remittances and to evaluate outcomes when we assume remittances are endogenous.   If we 
believe that remittances are to some degree determined by the wages received of the recipient or 
other unobservable factors that contribute both to the level of remittances and the labor of the 
household (such as the local labor market condition), then neglecting to account for the 
endogeneity of remittances may result in biased estimates.  Generally speaking, the lack of 
information on those individuals remitting funds has prevented other scholars from 
implementing more advanced empirical techniques (Bussolo & Medvedev, 2007; Kim, 2007).  
As most of the literature does not control for endogeneity, it is important to add to the evidence 
with a more appropriate methodology.       
To suggest remittances are endogenous, however, is insufficient without further 
describing the existing literature and theory pertaining to this topic.  In the following section, we 
delve more deeply into the previous literature, elaborating on the findings and methods, before 
presenting our own model and estimation. 
17 
 
 
 
Review of the Literature 
The Determinants and uses of Remittances 
Research on remittances tends to follow one of two paths – either the determinants of 
remittances (that is, why people send money from the host countries or urban centers to others) 
or the uses of remittances (how recipients choose to use the money in the developing country or 
rural area).  Only one paper, Rapoport and Docquier (2006), attempt to provide a complete 
picture of the impact of remittances by looking at both their determinants and uses.  
The determinants literature seeks to assess the various motivations and reasons for 
sending remittances. In one such paper, these reasons are grouped into two broad categories: 
individualistic and familial motivations (Rapoport & Docquier, 2006). The individualistic 
motives are essentially driven by self-interest, although there is some element of other-regarding 
preferences that come into play.  This set of motives includes altruism and inheritance motives, 
where individual remitters have a vested interest in sending remittances.  (Perhaps they wish to 
inherit property following a family member’s death).  The familial arrangements are either 
insurance or investments intended to reduce household income uncertainty or to expand total 
household income respectively, where some informal ‘contract’ is agreed upon prior to 
migration.  Such agreements are potentially huge in Jamaica given that migration is expensive 
and may be subsidized by relatives with the explicit understanding of repayment in the future. 
Another study by Stark and Lucas (1985) classifies the reasons for remittances into three 
categories rather than two, namely: pure altruism, pure self-interest, and tempered altruism / 
enlightened self-interest.  In this case, the third is not merely a combination of the first and 
second but involves the formulation of an informal contract between the migrant and family in 
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the home country, similar to that in the familial arrangement motivation mentioned above. This 
contract may require the migrant to remit to the household in repayment of the household’s 
investment in the migrant, whether in the form of funding migration costs or providing education 
for the migrant.   
The determinants discussed above are microeconomic in nature, but some authors have 
suggested macroeconomic determinants such as exchange rates, interest rates and wage (or 
income) differences (Alleyne, et al., 2008).  While interesting, we omit these macroeconomic 
determinants, given their lack of variability across individual recipients in the same nation. These 
variables affect how much the country receives in total remittances but may not explain person to 
person differences, our primary area of interest in this essay. 
In addition to existing studies on the motivation behind remitting, a second literature 
examines the effects of remittances on recipients’ behavior.  Like other forms of transfers, the 
aim of remittances is expected to alleviate the economic hardships of recipients.  Any resulting 
economic growth for the native country is of secondary concern to the donor and recipient.  
Therefore, we assess the impact of remittances at the microeconomic level, where we focus on 
the household units (Acosta, 2006; Adams, 2006).   
The Microeconomic Effect of Remittances on Labor Supply 
Although there are several studies specifically on how the receipt of remittances 
influences labor, empirical results suggest a relatively large range of effects (Acosta, 2006; 
Bussolo & Medvedev, 2007; Kim, 2007).  In this section, we will summarize existing work, 
compare the findings, and highlight factors that may explain why previous findings can be 
improved upon. 
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Remittance transfers ensuing from  migration are expected to affect labor supply in two 
ways (Acosta, 2006; Kim, 2007). First, migration implies an immediate decline in the labor 
supply for the home country, often referred to “brain drain.”  Legal migrants are not randomly 
selected (Borjas, 1987) and tend to be more educated than the average individual from a 
developing country.   Better skilled individuals are able to more easily satisfy the requirements to 
work abroad and are therefore over represented in the migrant population. The selection process 
ensures that the most talented migrants are eligible for work permits.  Because educated 
individuals in the developing country are also more likely than others to be employed if they 
remained in the developing country, albeit it at lower wages than if they relocated, their 
relocation significantly affects the quality and quantity of the labor force remaining.   
Potentially negative changes in the labor supply of the developing country may be 
partially offset by the receipt of remittances and theoretically higher wages for those that remain, 
particularly those that are educated, if this group is disproportionately affected by a loss in labor 
market competition.  Such flow of labor may also be advantageous to the developing countries, 
where shortages, such as those in nursing, may be filled by foreign-born individuals (Buerhaus, 
Staiger, & Auerbach, 2003).  This movement of labor across countries is the main subject of the 
“new economics of migration,” a school of thought that focuses on mutually beneficial aspects of 
labor flows at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels  (Massey et al., 1993).  
Migration may also result in a second wave of decreased labor supply.  Once the migrant 
is settled in the host country, she may then decide to send proceeds from her employment back to 
her home country in the form of remittances.  When this money is received, it can be treated as 
any other non-labor income, with the usual income and substitution effects resulting in increased 
consumption and leisure (if leisure is treated as a normal good), and hence an unambiguous 
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decline in labor.  Such theory, however, ignores the complexity of remittances, particularly if 
motivated by investment.  Suppose that the remittances are used for investment and business 
expansion purposes by the recipient, in which case remittances could actually be associated with 
increased labor if the result is a larger, stronger entrepreneurial effort.  A negative relationship 
between remittances and labor supply predicted by simple economic models is not a foregone 
conclusion, and many scholars have attempted to measure both the direction and magnitude of 
this relationship.  
 Ariola (2005) determines that like other sources of unearned income, remittances reduce 
total labor hours. He estimates income elasticity in the range -0.006 to -0.03.  Similarly, Kim 
(2006) finds a 3.6 percent reduction in hours worked due to remittances, and this remains robust 
to cross-sectional and panel data specifications.  Bussolo and Medvedev (2007) use a general 
equilibrium model and also find an overall negative effect of remittances on labor force 
participation for Jamaica.  Acosta (2006) concludes that there are negative effects of remittances 
on labor for females, but remittances are positively related to labor supply for middle-aged men, 
suggesting that remittances may be creating work opportunities in self-employment.   
 Kim (2007) separates the decision to enter the labor market from the decision of hours 
worked.  Specific to Jamaica, a country with increasing real wages coupled with persistently high 
unemployment, Kim (2007) determines that hours per week conditional on working does not 
differ between households across remittance status, but that the receipt of remittances reduces the 
probability of entering the labor market, thereby reducing total hours worked for the country.  
This may reflect workers’ inability to freely vary hours of work, often confined to non-optimal 
part-time or full-time hours.  Kim (2006) claims in a previous paper that the receipt of 
remittances appears to increase the reservation wage, and recipients of remittances are therefore 
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less likely to work.  Coupled with increased migration of skilled labor, increased remittances 
seem to exacerbate the phenomenon of high wages along with high unemployment, a symptom 
of a poorly functioning labor market (Kim 2006).  
Kim (2007, 2006) and Bussolo and Medvedev (2007) each use Jamaica as a case study, 
making their findings most relevant to the current paper.  Their findings, however, differ, 
perhaps a result of differences in methodology.  Kim (2006, 2007), for example, does not adjust 
for the endogeneity between wages, non-earned income such as remittances, and hours worked.  
Failing to correct for this problem in OLS models could bias results (Heckman, 1974).  
 Several studies looked at additional effects of remittances on household behavior.  Lu 
and Treiman (2007) find that benefits may accrue for black children in South Africa who are in 
households receiving remittances, controlling for expenditures on education.  Specifically, the 
researchers find lower levels of child labor in households receiving remittances (Lu & Treiman, 
2007).  (They also find that children in households where a parent has migrated but has not 
remitted funds may be worse off than children in non-migrant households because of the 
negative effect of out-migration without the positive economic effect.)  Overall, while 
remittances reduce labor supply, the finding that remittances reduce child labor is probably one 
instance in which a reduction in labor is a positive change.  
The importance of understanding how remittances affect labor supply is essential for 
governments interested in changing policies that permit the flow of remittances.  For example, if 
we link remittances to labor supply changes, then policies that either ease or restrict the flow of 
remittances could have substantial impacts on both households and the economy as a whole.  In 
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the next section, we further elaborate on the role of remittances as a non-labor income source for 
households and the relevant research. 
Remittance as a form of Income Transfer 
 Remittances are often excluded from labor supply research because of their small effect 
on labor in developed countries.  However, the receipt of remittances in developing countries is 
sometimes a major part of income and can affect the long term growth path of developing 
countries (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz, 2009) . While labor supply studies in developed countries 
understandably omit remittances, revision of theoretical and empirical approaches may be 
needed when looking at less developed countries.  
In the case of Jamaica, evidence seems to suggest that there is a greater reliance on 
remittances than government aide.  On average, government transfers are reported by eight to ten 
percent of households, and for these recipients, the transfers account for 59 percent of their total 
expenditure, according to data from the Survey of Living Conditions.   On the other hand, 
approximately sixty percent of households receive remittances and for these recipients, 
remittances represent almost 30 percent of total expenditure.   
Receipt of remittances is also distributed more equally across income groups than 
government assistance, as we would expect.  In Table 1, the population is divided into quintiles 
based on annual expenditures.   Receipt of government assistance, known in Jamaica as PATH, 
decreases with expenditures.  Receipt of remittances, however, varies from 59.97 to 62.54 
percent. 
The failure of the welfare system in Jamaica to reach the neediest households has been 
documented by past research (Levy & Ohls, 2007).  The hope is that the relatively new PATH 
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program will do a better job than its predecessors, but the data suggests that of the lowest income 
households, less than 20 percent receive funding, while a small fraction of the wealthiest 
households still do.  This means remittances may remain as the key income source for some of 
these lower income households.  
Table 1  
Distribution of Welfare and Remittance Receipts by Expenditure Quintiles 
 Expenditure Quintile 
 First Second Third Fourth Fifth 
Path Recipients 17.89% 13.18% 11.52% 9.81% 4.74% 
Remittance Recipients 61.19% 59.97% 62.54% 61.03% 61.48% 
Source: Author’s calculation from The Jamaica Survey of Living Condition. 
Theoretical Model of Labor Supply. 
Level of Decision Making 
One of the key considerations in labor market studies is the level of decision making.  In 
the literature, we usually look at either a unitary utility function or a collective utility function 
(Chiappori, 1992). The unitary utility approach treats the household as one agent with one set of 
preferences. Collective utility, on the other hand, allows for different preferences within the 
household with each member relying on the other(s).   Although the decisions to work and how 
much to work are influenced by the entire household, we still observe the agents individually.  
Since we are interested in the observed behavior rather than the actual decision process, it seems 
logical to use individual labor supply functions for each agent in the household, following the 
decision by at least one major labor supply study  (Luethold, 1968).  Interdependence between 
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household members is still factored into the model, however, by controlling for the spouse’s 
income. 
The household’s problem is to: 
 
   iiiiii LHTandPCLTWNtosubjectLCMaxU  )(,  (1) 
where, C is household consumption spending, the remittance benefit is included in N, non-labor 
income, W is the wage rate, T
i
 is the total non-sleep time endowment of person i, L
i
 is person i's 
leisure hours, and H
i
 is person i’s hours worked.  
Assuming Cobb Douglas preferences, a well behaved utility function is given by: 
  (   )         
(2) 
Where, C is consumption of goods and services within a year, and L is leisure.  
This is subject to time and financial constraints given by:  
          (   )  
(3) 
where, wL is Leisure times its price and pC is Consumption times prices of goods and services. 
On the income side, wT is wage times total time available to the household and includes the 
opportunity cost of working and (1-t)R is remittances net of transaction costs. 
Solving for C and L, we set up the following Lagrangian function: 
 
          [         (   ) ] (4) 
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The first order conditions are given by: 
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With the third being the budget constraint. 
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The optimality conditions provide an idea of the determinants of optimal leisure and 
consumption.  In the case of consumption, individuals increase consumption following increases 
in real income, regardless of whether from earned income (wages) or remittances.  The extent to 
which the two income streams affect consumption, however, is analyzed in the following essay.   
More relevant to the study at hand, however, is the optimality condition in Equation (12).  
It suggests optimal leisure is positively related to time endowments, as to be expected.  Increases 
in wages, or the price of leisure, decreases leisure, and increases in remittances increase leisure, 
ceteris paribus.  It is important to note that both remittances and wages need to be among the 
explanatory variables as it is their ratio that matters most.  An individual receiving $100 in 
remittances while facing a wage of $5 per hour will choose the same amount of leisure as an 
individual with identical preferences receiving $20 in remittances and earning a wage of $1 per 
hour.  
In the sections that follow, we develop an empirical approach that estimates the effects of 
remittances and wages (along with welfare payments not presented in the theoretical model) on 
labor, the difference between time endowments and leisure.  Additional covariates including 
household composition and household head characteristics are included as controls and assumed 
to affect , the household’s weighting of consumption versus leisure in its utility function.  
Before providing this model, however, we first detail our empirical approach and additional 
econometric problems addressed in this analysis.  
Empirical Issues 
 A number of problems arise when estimating labor market participation and hours 
worked.  Selecting the appropriate method is possible only after considering the empirical issues 
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that might arise.  As a result, this section is dedicated to discussing empirical issues, and the 
following section identifies methodologies which properly address these concerns.   
Self-selection  
The first potential problem is self-selection.  Self-selection bias arises from the use of 
either a truncated or a nonrandom sample of variables to estimate the treatment effect for the 
entire population. The self-selection in labor models is well documented (James  Heckman, 
1974; J. J. Heckman, 1979).   Wages, the decision to work, and hours worked cannot be viewed 
as independent of one another.  
Endogeneity of Key Variables 
A second problem is the potential endogeneity of some of the key explanatory variables. 
Firstly, wages are likely endogenous in the hours worked equation (Mroz, 1987).  One source of 
this endogeneity is an omitted variable, such as ability, which is correlated with not just hours of 
work but also the potential wage rate of the individual.  It is also possible that there is an element 
of reverse causality between wages and hours worked, if individuals willing to work full-time or 
over-time are rewarded with higher wages.   
Second, remittance receipt is likely endogenous as well, also a result of omitted variables.  
For example, poor health by the recipient may encourage migrants to send remittances and cause 
the recipient to work fewer hours.  The decrease in hours worked, however, is not strictly due to 
the remittances.  The appropriate model will instrument for remittances and determine the extent 
that this potential source of endogeneity exists.  
28 
 
 
 
A third variable in our model of labor supply which may be endogenous is wife’s 
education.  This is because missing ability and aptitude may affect participation in the labor 
market as well as hours worked for those how do participate.    
To effectively handle the endogeneity, we need variables which correlate with each of the 
endogenous variables but are not correlated with labor supply, except through other variables 
already in the regression. The criteria, while straight-forward, are not easy to satisfy, although we 
propose instruments for each of the endogenous variables in the Methodology section. 
 
The Methodology 
 The nature of the dependent variables, labor market participation and hours worked, 
combined with the problems outlined in the previous section, require careful selection of an 
econometric approach.  We begin by adapting an older and often relied upon labor supply model  
(Mroz, 1987). 
Labor Force Participation 
Our first model begins with a simple linear probability model predicting the effects of 
select covariates on labor force participation.  We then progress to a probit model, which more 
appropriately depicts the distribution of the dichotomous dependent variable.  Finally, we 
introduce instruments for the endogenous variables discussed in the early section. 
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We then can define labor force participation (LFP) as:  
 
LFP = {
 
 
                                                            
                                                            
 
 
(14) 
 
The probability of being in the labor force is then given by: 
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(15) 
where X includes wife’s education, total remittances, property income, kids 5 years old and 
under  as well as kids 6 and over, wife’s age and wife’s age squared and wife’s work experience.  
Hours of Work 
The second dependent variable is hours worked.  The static hours worked equation can be 
given as: 
               
  (     )   (  ) 
         (  ) 
     (  ) 
(16) 
where    is hours worked per week by the women in a long term relationship, and the vector    
includes: total remittances, the natural log of the woman’s wage, wife’s education, kids 5 and 
under (separated into own child versus other); kids 6 and over (again separated into own child 
versus other), property income, wife’s age and wife’s age squared.  The endogenous variables 
are logged wage, total remittances, and wife’s education and are presented above in their reduced 
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form as a function of all exogenous variables, Zi.  The Zi vector also includes two variables which 
are not included in Xi, namely: non-biological children in the home who are 5 and under and the 
number of non-biological children 6 and over, as well as the instrumental variables, average 
remittances to others in the enumeration district, husband’s education, and participation in the 
job market 5 years ago. These variables serve as the exclusion restrictions. 
The following section further discusses the usage of these instruments. 
Instruments 
Although we have discussed possible endogeneity and briefly introduced the instruments 
we will use, this section is devoted to further elaboration on these instruments.  For remittances, 
Acosta (2006) uses village level characteristics, such as the propensity of migration, to 
instrument for remittances (Acosta, 2006). Districts with a history of high migration are expected 
to be positively correlated with remittance receipts but not necessarily correlated with their 
dependent variable, in that case, child labor. Abdih, Chami et al (2008) estimate the causal 
relationship between home country institutions, such as the level corruption, and  remittances 
(Abdih, et al., 2008).  They use whether or not the area is located in the coastal regions. If yes, 
then this is expected to be positively correlated with remittances and not necessarily correlated 
with the level of corruption  
For remittances, we use the sum of remittance receipts in the enumeration district, a 
geographic district created for political purposes.  We then subtract the household’s own 
remittances from that total, and average this value based on the number of other household’s in 
the enumeration district.  This value likely reflects the migration from an area.  It may be 
correlated with a household’s level of remittances received but not necessarily participation 
within the labor market. 
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 Two additional variables are endogenous in the hours worked model.  First, wage is 
endogenous, again a result of omitted variables.  We include work experience in the labor market 
as an instrument for wage.  The second endogenous variable is the wife’s education, as a factor 
such as ability is likely correlated both with education and labor market participation.  Therefore, 
we use husband’s education as an instrument.  Although not a perfect instrument (Wooldridge 
2002), a preferable instrument is not available and using husband’s education is a common 
solution. 
Having briefly discussed the methods, we now introduce the available data, including the 
variables used and potential instruments, and present summary statistics for the sample. 
The Data 
We use two data sources, namely the Survey of Living Conditions (SLC) and the 
Jamaican Labor Force Survey (LFS).  The SLC in Jamaica began in 1988 as part of a larger 
study of living standards in developing countries, with a greater emphasis on evaluating 
immediate effects of public policy (Development Research Group 2002).  The data collection 
and sampling frame of the SLC are based on the larger LFS.  From the LFS, a smaller sample is 
randomly selected for inclusion in the more detailed Survey of Living Conditions.  The Survey 
of Living Conditions is administered by the Statistical Institute of Jamaica, but the principal 
investigator is the Planning Institute of Jamaica, both governmental departments.  Surveyors ask 
questions pertaining to education, crime, and health, but specific modules also focus on food and 
non-food expenditures as well as remittances.   
Though the surveys are conducted quarterly (January, April, July and October) with the 
SLC conducted one month after each round of the LFS, the quarter that is considered most stable 
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is the April quarter.  For this reason, the data used for the official labor force statistics and in our 
analysis are from the April quarter. Key to our analysis is that the Survey of Living Conditions 
collects information on remittances.  Using data from 2001-2007, we can assess the 
characteristics of those households receiving remittances and look at differences in labor supply 
behavior between those families receiving remittances and those not receiving remittances.  The 
household identification variable is used to link the Survey of Living Standards to the Jamaican 
Labor Force Survey.   
The data are self-weighted, meaning that the means and other statistics from the sample 
in the survey can be taken to reflect the entire population without the need for sample weights. 
However, even the best of samples still suffers from missing data issues which affect this self-
weighted attribute. This self-weighted feature remains true for all the years after using ‘raising 
factors’. These raising factors are made up of two sample weights: first, to account for non-
response, an enumeration district weight (edwght) is used, and secondly in order to improve the 
parish representativeness, a parish weight (parwght) is used.  
Data Cleaning 
Given that the data span several years, our task is complicated by changes in the survey 
over time. For instance, the Statistical Institute of Jamaica revised the labor force questionnaire 
in 2004, and thus, we readjust certain variables in the later years to make them compatible with 
2001-2003 data.  In some instances, the change amounts to a renaming of the variable.  For 
example, some variables are named according to the question number, and when the survey adds 
or deletes questions, the names of these variables change.  Specifically, the question: “What were 
you doing during the survey week?” is question 21a in 2004 but question 21 in previous years.  
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Similar adjustments are needed for almost all variable names when merging the 2001-03 and 
2004-2007 data. 
Other changes in the survey require more effort to address.  Some variables changed 
types over the years, going from a categorical variable to a numerical (interval) response.  One 
such question important in this paper’s analysis is “How many hours did you work during last 
week?”  Even though the question remains the same, it was recorded as a categorical variable 
(None, less than 9 hours, 9-16 hours, 17-24 hours, 25-32 hours, 33-40 hours, 41-49 hours, and 
over 49 hours) in 2001-2003, but as a numerical variable starting in 2004.  For years 2001-2003, 
the following process is used.  
Within each category, a normal distribution is assumed.  Respondents are then randomly 
assigned a value within the category, with the largest probability that they receive the mean 
hours worked from the category indicated.  The only exception to this procedure is the category 
33-40 hours, where clustering likely occurs at 40 hours per week.  As a result, we do not assume 
a normal distribution within this category and skew the distribution such that respondents have a 
near one probability of working 40 hours per week.  
In 2005, 2006, and 2007, the survey questions pertaining to remittances were also 
changed.  Surveyors started asking respondents to provide more detail on the source of their 
remittance receipts.  In addition, the 2006 survey included a module focused on remittance, and 
hence, additional questions were asked this year.   The main difference, however, is that 
households were asked to distinguish between cash and in-kind transfers when answering each of 
the questions below.  Relevant questions to calculating remittances are provided in Table 2. 
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Table 2  
Remittance Questions from the SLC by Year 
2001-2004 Surveys 2005 and 2007 surveys 2006 Survey 
Have you received income within the last 12 months from: 
Support for Children 
from parents who live 
elsewhere? 
Support for Children from 
parents living in Jamaica? 
Support for Children from 
parents living in Jamaica? 
Other relatives and 
friends who live in 
Jamaica? 
Support for children from 
parents living abroad 
Support for children from 
parents living abroad 
Other relatives and 
friends who live in 
abroad? 
Spouse/Partner who lives in 
Jamaica? 
Spouse/Partner who lives in 
Jamaica? 
 Spouse/Partner who lives in 
abroad? 
Spouse/Partner who lives in 
abroad? 
 Children who live in 
Jamaica? 
Children who live in Jamaica? 
 Children who live abroad? Children who live abroad? 
 Other relatives and friends 
who live in Jamaica? 
Other relatives who live in 
Jamaica? 
 Other relatives and friends 
who live in abroad? 
Other relatives who live in 
abroad? 
  Friends who live in Jamaica? 
  Friends who live in abroad? 
 
Outliers 
Although the frequency of outliers in this dataset is not common, a few outliers may skew 
the data, and as such, are removed from the sample.  To do this, we use the following method, 
viewed by most as a conservative means to identify outliers.  First, we estimate the regression 
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with all observations included.  Then, we obtain the residuals from this model and eliminate the 
observations if the residuals prove to be outliers.  In STATA, this is accomplished using the  
DFBETA command.  Out of all observations used in this analysis, this method removes only 6 
outlying observations.   
Summary Statistics 
Before presenting results, it is important to first describe the data.  Again, we are 
interested in the effects of remittances on labor market outcomes for women indicating non-
single status.  Some of these women are officially married, but common law marriages are also 
common in Jamaica, and thus, this study includes both set of women as those in long-term 
relationships. 
The summary statistics are provided in Table 4, but first, we include a description of each 
variable in Table 3.  Several of the variables do not take on the customary interpretations.  For 
example, one only needs to be looking for work – and not necessarily looking for work – to be 
counted in the labor force participation.  Second, previous work experience refers to whether or 
not the female participated in the labor force five years ago, either at the same job or a different 
job.  It does not represent the number of years worked. 
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Table 3  
Variable Definitions 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Is 1 if respondents report that they are working or whether they are not 
working and looking for jobs. Based on variables q21, q21a and q24, on 
the labor force survey. 
Wife's Hours 
Worked per 
Week 
Is based on variable q33 in the LFS, the number of hours usually worked 
per week.  
Wife's Wage per 
Hour 
Is calculated by first converting  total income (whether weekly, monthly 
or yearly)  and then dividing by the hours worked last week (variable q35 
in the LFS) 
Total 
Remittances (In 
000’s of USD) 
Is the sum of all remittances received by the household. 
HH's Kids 5 and 
under  
Is children of the Wife who are 5 years old and younger. 
HH's Kids 6 and 
over 
Is the number of children of the wife who are 6 years old and older. 
Other Kid's 5 
and under 
Is the number of children 5 and under who are not the biological children 
of the household heads. 
Other Kid's 6 
and Over 
Is the number of children 6 and over who are not the biological children 
of the household heads. 
Wife’s Age Is the age of the wife. 
Wife’s work 
experience 
(Previously 
worked=1) 
Is 0 if wives report having worked 3 or less months in current job, 1 if 
between 3 to 6 months, 2 if between 6 to 9 months, 3 if between 9 to 12 
months, 5 if between 1 to 2 years, 8 if between 2 and 5 years and 12 if 5 
years and over. This is based on q311 in the LFS. 
Wife’s Education  Is the highest degree earned by the wife based on variable q322 on the 
SLC. It is 0 if no form of certification, 1 if high school subjects passed is 
at the basic level, 2 if 1-2 Caribbean Examination Council exams (CXCs) 
are passed at the general level, 4 if 3 to 4 CXCs at the general level, 6 if 5 
or more CXCs, 8 if 1-2 UK-based General Council Examinations (GCE), 
9 if 3 or more GCEs and 12 if the respondent has a university degree. 
Property Income Is total family labor income minus the wife’s labor income.  
 
 Table 4 describes the sample of all women in a serious, long-term relationship regardless 
of remittance receipt.  Additional tables provide information specifically for remittance 
recipients and non-recipients.   
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From the summary statistics, we find that the reported average hours worked is one and a 
half hours less per week for recipients of remittances, and that conditional on having received 
remittances, the average amount is more than $910 per year.  There are, however, significantly 
more children, on average, in households receiving remittances.  Remittance recipients are less 
educated and can expect lower wages in the labor market, on average.  Recipients are generally 
older, have less in property income (family income less the wife’s income), and report less in 
total household consumption. 
Table 4  
Summary Statistics for Women in a Relationship 
All Married Women or Women on Common 
Law Unions 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Labor force Participation(=1) 5,574 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Wife's weekly hours  3,254 40.31 9.64 3.00 60.00 
Wife's wage 5,570 0.34 0.54 0.00 4.05 
Total Remittances (In 000’s of USD) 5,517 0.50 1.52 0.00 47.65 
HH's Kids 5 and under 5,574 0.39 0.66 0.00 4.00 
HH's Kids 6 and over 5,574 0.94 1.21 0.00 8.00 
Other Kid's 5 and under 5,574 0.16 0.52 0.00 6.00 
Other Kid's 6 and Over 5,574 0.30 0.79 0.00 9.00 
Wife’s Age 5,574 44.12 15.30 4.00 96.00 
Wife’s Education (Highest Degree) 5,574 0.58 2.22 0.00 12.00 
Property Income  5,563 3.26 5.57 0.00 75.70 
Instruments 
     Wife’s work experience  5,574 5.81 5.54 0.00 12.00 
Average Remittances in District (in  USD 
‘000S) 5,517 0.73 0.95 0.00 10.40 
Husband’s Education (Highest Degree) 5,574 0.43 1.96 0.00 12.00 
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Table 5  
Summary Statistics for Married Women who are Remittance Recipients 
Married Women who are recipients Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Labor force Participation(=1) 3,028 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Wife's weekly hours  1,653.00 39.69 10.11 3.00 60.00 
Wife's wage 3,027 0.32 0.52 0.00 2.75 
Total Remittances (In 000’s of USD) 3,019 0.91 1.97 0.00 47.65 
HH's Kids 5 and under 3,028 0.38 0.67 0.00 4.00 
HH's Kids 6 and over 3,028 0.90 1.20 0.00 8.00 
Other Kid's 5 and under 3,028 0.23 0.60 0.00 6.00 
Other Kid's 6 and Over 3,028 0.42 0.92 0.00 9.00 
Wife’s Age 3,028 46.28 16.23 6.00 96.00 
Wife’s Education (Highest Degree) 3,028 0.45 1.94 0.00 12.00 
Property Income  3,024 3.21 5.33 0.00 75.70 
Instruments      
Wife’s work experience  3,028 5.47 5.58 0.00 12.00 
Average Remittances in District (in  
USD ‘000S) 
3,019 0.81 1.03 0.00 8.16 
Husband’s Education (Highest 
Degree) 
3,028 0.34 1.72 0.00 12.00 
 
Table 6  
Married Women who are not Recipients of Remittances 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Labor force Participation(=1) 2,498 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Wife's weekly hours  1,573 40.93 9.10 4.00 60.00 
Wife's wage 2,495 0.36 0.57 0.00 4.05 
Total Remittances (In 000’s of USD) 2,498 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HH's Kids 5 and under 2,498 0.40 0.65 0.00 4.00 
HH's Kids 6 and over 2,498 1.00 1.23 0.00 7.00 
Other Kid's 5 and under 2,498 0.08 0.37 0.00 6.00 
Other Kid's 6 and Over 2,498 0.16 0.56 0.00 7.00 
Wife’s Age 2,498 41.57 13.66 4.00 89.00 
Wife’s Education (Highest Degree) 2,498 0.73 2.51 0.00 12.00 
Property Income  2,491 3.35 5.86 0.00 69.18 
Wife’s work experience  2,498 6.24 5.48 0.00 12.00 
Average Remittances in District (in  USD ‘000S) 2,498 0.62 0.84 0.00 10.40 
Husband’s Education (Highest Degree) 2,498 0.53 2.23 0.00 12.00 
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As already indicated, the dependent variables in this analysis are hours worked and labor 
force participation and the primary variable of interest is the level of remittances received.  
Additional variables, however, are included in the model, and although presented in the tables 
above, have yet to be formally introduced.  Such variables include age, education of the head of 
household, and other sources of income for the household.  Household characteristics, including 
the number of children under age 5 and over age 6, and household consumption are also included 
in the model.  
Testing the Reliability of Reported Remittances 
  We test the accuracy of the remittance data by extrapolating from the figure in the 
survey to a figure that would represent the population of Jamaica and compare this figure to 
those reported by the Bank of Jamaica and the International Monetary Fund. Both these 
institutions report the in-cash transfers of remittances based on the level of the financial flows 
reported by transfer agents.    
To compare the remittance figure from the survey and Bank of Jamaica, we first multiply 
the average level of remittances received by households in the survey by the number of 
households in Jamaica as reported in the 2001 census.  We then create a ratio of this figure to 
that of the Bank of Jamaica, where the higher the ratio indicates more accurate reporting of 
remittances. 
Based on this calculation, the remittance figures from the household survey are 
underestimated between 25 and 80 percent.  The upper limit of this range is close to the 77 
percent underreporting of remittances found for Armenia (Roberts, 2004) and average of this 
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range is close to the more than fifty percent underreporting  of remittances in Mexico (Acosta, 
2006).
 8
 
Table 7 gives a summary of the total remittances from the survey data as well as from the 
Bank of Jamaica. As can be seen, the survey responses grossly underestimate the level of 
remittances calculated by the Bank of Jamaica.  However, the Bank of Jamaica’s figures include 
all types of transfers from migrants, including funds from migrants which are not necessarily 
intended for the recipient.  For example, it is very common for migrants from Jamaica to remit 
money to build houses in their native country.  Family members receive the transfer but use the 
money to pay for construction.  This will not be recorded in the SLC because of the questions’ 
wording.  The money was not sent “for” the recipient.  Instead, the SLC questions ask whether 
the respondent receives support through remittances.  Depending on the level of transfers 
intended for investment on the sender’s behalf, it could be the case that the Bank of Jamaica 
overstates the level of remittances received in any given year.  
  
                                                          
8
 Reported by the IMF using international flow of funds. 
41 
 
 
 
Table 7   
Remittances from Survey and the Bank of Jamaica 
Year Sample 
mean 
Number 
of hhs. 
Total 
Population 
Estimated 
Remittances  (in 
US$ mns) 
Bank of 
Jamaica Figure 
(in US$ mns) 
As a % of 
BOJ 
figure 
2001 945 748,000 2,612,500 707 940 75.19% 
2002 779 752,063 2,624,700 586 1,131 51.81% 
2003 366 756,905 2,641,600 277 1,270 21.83% 
2004 838 757,766 2,644,604 635 1,466 43.31% 
2005 388 761,232 2,656,700 295 1,621 18.20% 
2006 505 764,900 2,669,500 387 1,771 21.83% 
2007 500 768,510 2,682,100 384 1,964 19.57% 
 
 Survey data on income (and by extension remittances) has been shown in to suffer from a 
variety of issues (Deaton, 1997). The main ones include recall bias, seasonality (where income 
questions requested over the course of a year while consumption questions are framed as daily or 
weekly) and long questionnaires which can lead to respondent’s fatigue. Additionally, 
remittances are prone to underreporting because it requires knowledge of not just the cash 
portion but also in-kind transfers in the form of goods, something for which the recipients may 
not know the full value.   
 Because of the costs involved in ensuring that income and remittance data is accurate, 
there is reason to believe the problem of underreporting will persist, especially for poor 
countries. This creates a need to use certain adjustments to existing data in order to correct for 
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underreporting,  something  much of the previous research has failed to do (Grigorian, 
Melkonyan, & Shonkwiler, 2008).   
Approximately 1000 respondents report receiving remittances when asked a yes or no 
question about outside income sources but later refused to provide a value for these remittances 
(or reported a value of zero).  Assuming the first indication of remittances is true, we use a 
regression approach to predict the true value of remittances for these missing values.  Positive 
remittance values are regressed on district level remittances, school expenditures as a share of 
total expenditures, age, and residing in an urban area.  Predicted values for all households are 
generated.  A new variable is then created, equal to reported remittances if the value is positive, 
zero if the household reported zero remittances and indicated no, they did not receive 
remittances, and the imputed value if the household reported no remittance amount but indicated 
yes, they received remittances.  This method fails to account for general underreporting (for 
instance, reporting $1,000 when the true receipt is $5,000) and the possibility that some 
households reported receiving no remittances when they in fact did, but is still seen as a general 
improvement to using remittance amounts as reported during the survey. Interestingly, 
remittance as a share of GDP and income as a share of GDP are fairly close to the value of these 
two variables calculated using IMF statistics for Jamaica, indicating that the underreporting may 
uniformly affect both remittances and income. This finding gives some credibility to using the 
share of remittances to total expenditure as the key explanatory variable of interest, which we do 
in Chapter 2.  
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Hypotheses 
In this section, we build a set of testable hypotheses based on findings in previous 
research (Acosta, 2006; Moffitt, 2002; Mroz, 1987) and general intuition.  First, we consider the 
theoretical effect of all of the variables in the outcome equations, labor force participation 
(Equation 15) and hours worked (Equation 16).  
Given the research question, how do remittances affect labor market outcomes by women 
in relationships, the most important variable is remittances.  Based on the literature review earlier 
in this paper, we expect remittances to negatively affect average hours worked.  Receipt of 
remittances, ceteris paribus, generates an income effect, where recipients can consume more 
goods and more leisure with fewer hours worked.  For individuals on the cusp of not working 
before remittances, receipt of remittances may generate enough of an income effect to make no 
hours worked (or non-participation in the labor market) their optimal choice.  We expect that the 
larger the remittances received the lower the hours worked relative to those who do not receive 
remittances and the less likely someone is to participate in the labor force.     
Additional variables are worth discussing.  Having children five and under in the 
household may have an effect on labor force participation and hours worked, but the effect could 
be ambiguous. On the one hand, having children may increase the work effort in order to provide 
financially for them, but on the other hand, it may reduce work effort if the parent is forced to 
stay home and act as primary care giver. Here again, the gender of the household agent of 
interest may be important.  Male heads of household may be more likely to work while female 
heads may be more likely to stay home and care for young children.  Because this study looks 
exclusively at females, we expect the second effect, a decline in labor market participation to 
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dominate.  For children over age five and thus in school, we expect that females have more time 
to enter the labor market, and thus, this variable is less ambiguous. 
The indicator for having an older parent in the home may also be ambiguous for similar 
reasons.  Depending on the health of the parent, an individual may be forced to stay home and 
care for the parent or work more to help provide basic necessities for the parent.  If the parent is 
relatively healthy, it could also be the case that the parent is available to care for children and the 
home, thus freeing up the female to engage in more labor market activity.  Of course, unlike 
children under 6, it is also possible that the parent has accumulated savings and is able to 
subsidize the household, although this is unlikely for most Jamaican households.   
Lastly, education is expected to increase both hours worked and labor force participation.  
Individuals who invested in education in previous years likely did so with the expectation that 
they would be working and earning returns to their education investment in the current time 
period. 
Results 
Labor Force Participation 
In this section, we present results from multiple estimations.  We begin with estimation of 
the labor force participation equation. The results in Table 8 give a comparison of the estimates 
from the linear probability model, the logit model and the probit.  Note that the first set of results 
does not account for potential endogeneity, and that these results are presented in the following 
table.  These tables nonetheless give us a base with which to compare future, more 
econometrically sound approaches.   
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The first thing we observe is that the same variables are significant across all three 
models, even though as expected the coefficient estimates are different in magnitude. 
Wooldridge (2002) uses the following ‘rough’ rule of thumb when comparing logit and probit 
estimates with parameters from a linear probability model: divide the logit estimates by 4 and the 
probit by 2.5 (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2002). Alternatively we could compute the marginal 
effects from the logit and probit models.  
In looking at the coefficient for remittances, both the sign and magnitude are worthy of 
discussion.  Remittances negatively affect the participation rate, supporting the theory that 
recipients may be dependent on this source of income voluntarily or involuntarily.  This negative 
effect could also be explained by the effect remittances could have on job search activity.  Just as 
it is plausible for unemployment benefits to decrease the motivation to search for jobs, so too, 
could receipt of remittances for countries heavily dependent on this income source.   Although 
this effect is negative, as hypothesized, the magnitude is extremely small.  A one thousand dollar 
increase in remittances is expected to decrease the probability of working by 0.01 in all three 
cases (converting the probit and logit parameters to marginal effects).  The average recipient 
reports just under $1,000, so only those houses receiving very large amounts of remittances are 
expected to change their labor market participation significantly. 
Other factors included in the model significantly affect labor market participation.  
Property income (calculated as family earned income minus the wife’s income) which proxies 
for household wealth, is significant and positive.  This means that as other household members’ 
incomes increase, this increases the probability of the female participating in the labor market.  
This is somewhat counterintuitive as we expected a negative effect if leisure is a normal good. 
For Mroz (1987), this coefficient is negative in all specifications. Of course, the labor market in 
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Jamaica is quite different from the United States labor market, and differences are therefore 
expected.  It could be the case that unobservable factors that affect the selection of partnerships – 
such as the ability to find and keep a job – could be confounding this result.    
As expected, the wife’s education is positively associated with labor force participation.  
If education is viewed as an investment, then those with greater investments are more likely to 
realize greater returns by participating in the labor force. 
The greater the number of biological children 5 years old or less, the less likely it is for 
the wife to be in the labor force.  Having biological children 6 and over has the opposite effect.  
The presence of children in the household who are not the biological children of the wife do not 
affect labor market participation.  As expected, labor market participation of the wife increases 
with age but at a decreasing rate.  
Table 8 
 Labor Force Participation (Parish and Year Control Variables Included) 
Dependent Variable is LFP LPM LOGIT PROBIT 
Total Remittances (In 000’s of USD) -0.007* -0.041* -0.025* 
 (0.004) (0.023) (0.013) 
Property Income 0.002** 0.011* 0.007** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) 
HH's Kids 5 and under -0.100*** -0.448*** -0.278*** 
 (0.011) (0.051) (0.031) 
HH's Kids 6 and over 0.021*** 0.082*** 0.054*** 
 (0.006) (0.027) (0.016) 
Other Kid's 5 and under 0.012 0.057 0.037 
 (0.013) (0.061) (0.037) 
Other Kid's 6 and Over -0.007 -0.018 -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.042) (0.025) 
Wife’s Age 0.013*** 0.080*** 0.039*** 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.005) 
Wife’s Age Squared -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wife’s Education (Highest Degree) 0.034*** 0.274*** 0.144*** 
 (0.003) (0.029) (0.013) 
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_cons 0.691*** 0.193 0.325** 
 (0.057) (0.294) (0.161) 
Year and Parish Controls YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.15 0.12 0.12 
N 5,510 5,510 5,510 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
Next, we present results from a linear probability model and probit estimation, this time 
using instruments for the endogenous variables.  In these models, two variables are treated as 
endogenous, remittances and the wife’s education.  For remittances, we use average district level 
remittance receipts to other households as the instrument.  For the wife’s education, we include 
the husband’s education, as is often done in the existing literature. 
Based on the results in Table 9, we now find that remittances have no statistically 
significant effect on labor force participation.  This result is interesting, as it challenges findings 
from previous research that has failed to account for endogeneity.  For example, Kim (2007) 
finds that remittances may not affect hours worked, but it still affects labor market participation.  
He does not control for endogeneity, however, suggesting why these results might be an 
improvement upon previous findings. 
  The wife’s education is still positively associated with labor force participation, 
consistent with previous findings and theory.  Other variables largely maintain their significance 
and signs compared to the estimation in Table 8.  Property income, at least in the probit 
estimation, is still positively associated with increased labor force participation, although this 
effect is small.  Younger children decrease participation, while older children increase the 
likelihood of a female working outside the home.  Finally, increases in age are expected to 
increase the probability of participating in the labor market, although this effect still diminishes 
as age increases. 
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Following Table 9, we present additional tables demonstrating the strength of the selected 
instruments as well as the reduced forms of the endogenous variables. 
Table 9  
Participation in the Labor Market-Instrumental Approaches 
Dependent Variable is LFP IV LPM IV PROBIT 
Total Remittances (In 000’s of USD) 0.011 0.034 
 (0.013) (0.044) 
Wife’s Education (Highest Degree) 0.051*** 0.161*** 
 (0.011) (0.047) 
Property Income 0.003** 0.008** 
 (0.001) (0.004) 
HH's Kids 5 and under -0.106*** -0.302*** 
 (0.012) (0.038) 
HH's Kids 6 and over 0.022*** 0.055*** 
 (0.006) (0.020) 
Wife’s Age 0.013*** 0.042*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) 
Wife’s Age Squared -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
_cons 0.621*** 0.260 
 (0.068) (0.210) 
Year and Parish Controls YES YES 
R2 0.07  
N 5,506 5,506 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
 
For the LFP regressions, we use average remittances received in the district by other households 
(excluding the respondent’s reported remittances) as an instrument for the respondent’s 
remittances and husband’s education as an instrument for wife’s education.  As Table (10) 
shows, the instruments in the LFP equation perform quite well. First, for the under-identification 
and weak identification tests, the null hypothesis that the model is under-identified or weakly 
identified, respectively, are both rejected.  Furthermore, the Sargan- Hansen statistic tests the 
null that all instruments are uncorrelated with u.  We fail to reject this null hypothesis, suggesting 
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the equations are not over-identified.  Results from the reduced form regressions are presented 
below in Table 11. These reduced form regressions show that the instruments significantly 
explain variability in the endogenous variables. 
Table 10  
Check of the Instrumental Variables: IVREG2 Postestimation in Stata  
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):                      75.15 
Chi-sq(4) P-val =    0.0000  
  
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic): 22.312 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 5% maximal IV relative bias 11.04 
10% maximal IV relative bias    7.56 
20% maximal IV relative bias 5.57 
30% maximal IV relative bias 4.73 
10% maximal IV size 16.87 
15% maximal IV size 9.93 
20% maximal IV size 7.54 
25% maximal IV size 6.28 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 1.337 
Chi-sq(2) P-val = 0.5124  
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Table 11  
Reduced-form Regressions of the Endogenous Variables on All Exogenous Variables 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Remittances Wife's Education 
Average Other Remittances in District (in  USD 
‘000S) (Instrument for Remittances ) 
0.534*** 0.011 
(0.021) (0.021) 
Husband’s Education (Highest Degree) (Instrument 
for Wife’s Education) 
-0.005 0.274*** 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Property Income -0.001 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
HH's Kids 5 and under 0.063* 0.069** 
 (0.033) (0.033) 
HH's Kids 6 and over 0.011 -0.077*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
Wife’s Age -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Wife’s Age Squared 0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
_cons -0.177 1.652*** 
 (0.172) (0.170) 
Year and Parish Controls YES YES 
R
2
 0.15 0.36 
N 5,506 5,506 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
Hours Worked 
Having estimated the probability of participation in the labor market, we now turn our 
attention to the second outcome measure, hours worked.  Participation in the labor market is 
coded identically whether someone works part-time, fulltime, or overtime, and while it is 
sufficient in helping us understand the effects of remittances on who joins the labor force, it 
omits detail as to how long individuals are actually working.     
In this part of the essay, we regress hours worked on the value of remittances.  A simple 
OLS model, however, will produce biased results since hours worked equals zero for all 
individuals not in the labor market.  Therefore, we employ a Tobit model, designed to handle 
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selection and censoring.  Table 12 presents results from a basic Tobit model when all variables 
are assumed exogenous.   
We find that increases in the wife’s wage is negatively associated with hours worked.  
This supports a theory of a backward-bending labor supply curve and that the income effect 
dominates the substitution effect.  Remittances are also negatively associated with hours worked, 
although this effect is not statistically significant from zero.  Increases in the wife’s education are 
expected to increase hours worked, ceteris paribus, while the number and age of biological 
children in the household significantly affects weekly work schedules. 
As was the case with labor market participation, young children are expected to decrease 
hours worked.  For each biological child under age five, expected hours worked decreases by 
more than seven hours per week, even after adjusting for those not participating in the labor 
market.  An additional biological child over the age of six actually increases the female’s work-
load, although this may reflect additional assistance in caring for the house and younger children.  
Caring for other people’s children in your home has no effect on hours worked, ceteris paribus.  
Age is expected to increase hours worked until age 31, at which point the negative effect on age 
square begins to dominate, and hours worked will decrease, ceteris paribus. 
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Table 12  
Basic Tobit Model 
Dependent Variable: Wife’s Hours worked  
Log of Wife’s Wage -23.266*** 
 (1.085) 
Total Remittances (In 000’s of USD) -0.494 
 (0.319) 
Property Income 0.404*** 
 (0.084) 
Wife’s Education (Highest Degree) 2.860*** 
 (0.154) 
HH's Kids 5 and under -7.050*** 
 (1.146) 
HH's Kids 6 and over 0.868** 
 (0.356) 
Other Kid's 5 and under 0.530 
 (0.736) 
Other Kid's 6 and Over -0.597 
 (0.581) 
Wife’s Age 1.131*** 
 (0.279) 
Wife’s Age Squared -0.018*** 
 (0.003) 
Cons  28.656*** 
 (5.746) 
Sigma_cons 29.188*** 
 (0.324) 
Year and Parish Controls YES 
N 5,510 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
  
 The Tobit controls for the censoring at zero and labor market participation, but as 
previously mentioned, several variables in the model may be endogenous, and hence, the results 
are biased.  In the next table, we instrument for remittances, wife’s wages, and wife’s education.  
Results are presented in Table 13. 
 We find that conditional on participating in the labor market, a one percent increase in the 
wife’s wages decreases expected hours work by more than four hours per week.  The effect of 
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remittances, once we instrument for this variable, is now much larger in magnitude than in the 
previous estimation, but it still lacks statistical significance.  As expected, additional education 
increases hours worked substantially.   
Table 13   
Instrumental Variable Estimation of the Tobit Model 
Dependent Variable: Wife’s hours of work   
Log of Wife’s Wage -437.034*** 
 (42.558) 
Total Remittances (In 000’s of USD) -3.768 
 (4.500) 
Wife’s Education (Highest Degree) 16.874*** 
 (1.803) 
Property Income 3.293*** 
 (0.495) 
HH's Kids 5 and under -5.373* 
 (2.839) 
HH's Kids 6 and over -1.337 
 (1.426) 
Wife’s Age 0.082 
 (0.431) 
Wife’s Age Squared -0.006 
 (0.004) 
_cons 31.204** 
Year and Parish Controls YES 
 (13.540) 
N 5,506 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
 To demonstrate the suitability of the instruments, the first stage reduced-form estimates 
are presented in Table 14.  All proposed instruments are significant for their respective 
endogenous variables.   
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Table 14  
First Stage Reduced-Form Estimates of the Endogenous Variables 
 Dependent Variable 
 Wage Remittance Wife's Education 
Wife’s work experience  0.043*** -0.009*** 0.060*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) 
Average Remittances in District (in  USD 
‘000S) 
0.006 0.533*** 0.020 
 (0.007) (0.073) (0.038) 
Husband’s Education (Highest Degree) 0.010** 0.001 0.481*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.035) 
Other Kid's 5 and under -0.033*** 0.133*** -0.155*** 
 (0.013) (0.039) (0.030) 
Other Kid's 6 and Over -0.028*** 0.125*** -0.069*** 
 (0.008) (0.035) (0.021) 
Property Income  0.026*** -0.004 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) 
HH's Kids 5 and under -0.018* 0.067* -0.012 
 (0.011) (0.038) (0.045) 
HH's Kids 6 and over -0.007 0.019 -0.103*** 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.020) 
Wife’s Age -0.004** -0.004 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) 
Wife’s Age Squared 0.000 0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
_cons 0.153*** -0.081 0.168 
 (0.054) (0.137) (0.223) 
Year and Parish Controls Yes YES YES 
R
2
 0.32 0.15 0.27 
N 5,506 5,506 5,506 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
Robustness checks 
 The previous findings, that remittances, after controlling for endogeneity, do not affect 
labor force participation or hours worked, is interesting, and raises additional questions that 
should be addressed.  First, remittances may be underestimated.  If remittances truly have an 
effect, but a substantial number of households fail to report remittances accurately, then our 
estimated effects may be biased.  Secondly, the effect of remittances may be nonlinear.  In its 
current form, a change from $500 to $1,000 is expected to be identical to the case of increasing 
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remittances from $2,000 to $2,500.  Once households have reached $2,000, for example, they 
may have already changed their labor market behavior as much as possible (withdrawing from 
the market, for example) while those receiving $1000 may reduce hours, but the level of 
remittances is still insufficient to completely leave the labor force.  Thirdly, this essay has 
focused on the decisions of females in long-term relationships, but other heads-of-household 
may be affected by remittances.  In this section, we briefly address each of these issues and 
present results for further discussion. 
Imputed Remittances 
As mentioned previously in this essay, the value of remittances is likely underreported.  
A nontrivial number of households indicated they received remittances but then do not report 
positive values of remittances.  As a result, we impute remittances for these households using 
current household remittances as a function of age of the household head, district level 
remittances (which is the instrumental variable) and other kids 6 and over who are not biological 
children of the head of household.  These are the variables which yield significant and positive 
effects on remittances. We then use the coefficients from this regression to calculate household 
remittances for those who report that they receive some remittances but fail to give the amount. 
Results from this regression are in Table 15, followed by updated summary statistics when we 
include imputed values for those that report receiving remittances but do not indicate how much 
is received. 
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Table 15  
Predicting Remittances 
Dependent variable: Current Household Remittances Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Wife’s Age 0.007 
 (6.48)*** 
Average Remittances in District (in  USD ‘000S) 0.810 
 (23.22)*** 
Other Kid's 6 and Over 0.133 
 (2.92)*** 
R
2
 0.36 
N 2,437 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
Table 16 
 Summary Statistics of Actual (from Survey) and Updated Remittances 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Total Remittances (In 000’s 
of USD) 
5,521 0.50 1.52 0.00 47.65 
Updated Total Remittances 
(In 000’s of USD) 
5,521 0.57 1.52 0.00 47.65 
  
After replacing zero with the predicted value from Table 15, average remittances increase by 
$70. 
 The next step is to include the imputed remittances in our labor force participation and 
hours worked models.  Again, remittances for those that report positive values remain 
unchanged.  Remittances for those that report receiving no remittances and an amount of zero 
remain at zero.  The change only occurs for those respondents who indicated they did receive 
remittances but failed to provide a positive amount.  Results are located in Table 17. 
 As expected, our results are only strengthened by using the imputed results.  In other 
words, the under-reporting of remittances biased results downward, as individuals who were 
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actually responding to the receipt of remittances were included in the group not receiving 
remittances.  
Table 17  
Imputing Remittances 
 IV OLS IV PROBIT IV TOBIT 
Dependent Variable: Wife’s LFP Wife’s LFP Wife’s Hours worked 
Log of Wife’s Wage   -437.295*** 
   (41.686) 
Imputed Total Remittances (In 000’s 
of USD) 
0.009 0.036 -3.961 
 (0.012) (0.038) (3.259) 
Wife’s Education (Highest Degree) 0.029*** 0.126*** 16.830*** 
 (0.005) (0.026) (2.126) 
Property Income 0.003** 0.008*** 3.296*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.580) 
HH's Kids 5 and under -0.101*** -0.283*** -5.378** 
 (0.011) (0.030) (2.437) 
HH's Kids 6 and over 0.020*** 0.050*** -1.315 
 (0.006) (0.016) (1.385) 
Wife’s Age 0.013*** 0.040*** 0.082 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.316) 
Wife’s Age Squared -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.006* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
_cons 0.638*** 0.304* 31.079*** 
 (0.065) (0.167) (9.818) 
Year and Parish Controls YES YES YES 
N 5,506 5,506 5,506 
R
2
 0.14   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
 
Testing the Effect of Remittances on Other Demographic Groups 
 The last point to address is identifying the effects of remittances for other demographic 
groups, including single females, married men, and single men.  Again, the focus has been on 
women in long-term relationships, generally the group discussed in other labor research.  The 
nature of remittances, however, is a bit different, as recipients are not targeted based on need or 
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education but instead are those with family members willing and able to find jobs elsewhere and 
remit funding.  Recipients, therefore, are most likely to be female, but they could also be men, 
receiving money from children, parents, friends, or spouses who have had more luck finding 
employment elsewhere. 
 Table 18 evaluates the effect of remittances on women who report being single heads of 
the household.  Still using the imputed values from earlier in this section, we find a reduction in 
the probability of working even after instrumenting for remittances.  Note that without a husband 
present (and later without a wife present for single males), we use the educational attainment of 
the oldest child in the household as an instrument.  Once controlling for endogeneity, a $1000 
increase in remittances decreases the probability of entering the labor market by 5.5 percent.  
Conditional on working however, remittances do not appear to affect hours worked.  Combined 
with the earlier findings for women in a relationship, we would assert that the total effect of 
remittances on the decision to work for all women in Jamaica is small, and conditional on 
working, remittances do not affect the hours worked for females. 
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Table 18  
Single Women 
 LPM IV OLS IV 
PROBIT 
TOBIT IV TOBIT 
Dependent 
Variable 
LFP LFP LFP  Hours of 
Work 
Hours of 
Work 
Imputed Total 
Remittances (In 
000’s of USD) 
-0.010*** -0.017** -0.055** -0.534*** 0.522 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.023) (0.202) (1.789) 
Property Income 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.067*** 1.123*** 4.185*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.315) (0.836) 
HH's Kids 5 and 
under 
-0.095*** -0.092*** -0.291*** -8.404*** 5.139 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.044) (0.831) (3.177) 
HH's Kids 6 and 
over 
0.022*** 0.022*** 0.056** 1.095** 2.128 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.459) (2.014) 
Other Kid's 5 
and under 
-0.006   -0.582  
 (0.011)   (1.075)  
Other Kid's 6 
and Over 
0.001   0.916**  
 (0.007)   (0.436)  
Wife’s Age 0.003** 0.003 0.011 0.385*** -0.239 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.149) (0.339) 
Wife’s Age 
Squared 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.012*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) 
Education 
Highest Degree 
Attained 
0.024*** 0.023* 0.099 1.992*** 15.327*** 
 (0.003) (0.014) (0.070) (0.246) (3.878) 
Log(Wage)    -22.201*** -339.701*** 
    (2.743) (39.323) 
Sigma_cons    29.192***  
    (0.410)  
_cons 0.862*** 0.862*** 0.979*** 39.504*** 18.826* 
 (0.049) (0.056) (0.215) (4.671) (9.708) 
Year and Parish 
Fixed Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.27 0.26    
N 4,889 4,886 4,886 4,889 4,886 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
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 Results for the next group, married men, are presented in Table 19.  We find that when 
instrumenting for remittances, the probability of entering the labor force decreases, but once the 
decision to work has been made, remittances positively increase hours work.  This last point is 
particularly interesting since remittances were expected to significantly decrease hours worked 
prior to adjusting for potential endogeneity.   
 Once we remove factors that may affect both remittances and labor force participation, 
we find that increasing remittances by $1000 only decreases the probability of entering the labor 
force by less than 0.04.  Additionally, we find that a one thousand dollar increase in remittances 
is expected to increase hours worked by almost 5.5 hours per week.  This counters the notion that 
remittances negatively affect labor supply and hence a country’s productivity, as previously 
suggested.  It may instead be the case that the influx of outside money to a community increases 
consumption and hence increases employment opportunities. 
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Table 19  
Married Men 
 LPM IV OLS IV 
PROBIT 
TOBIT IV TOBIT 
Dependent 
Variable 
LFP LFP LFP  Hours of 
Work 
Hours of 
Work 
Imputed Total 
Remittances 
(In 000’s of 
USD) 
-0.008*** 0.006 -0.037*** -0.632*** 5.494* 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.013) (0.162) (3.158) 
Property 
Income 
0.001 0.001* 0.017*** 0.056 2.062* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.062) (1.139) 
HH's Kids 5 
and under 
-0.010 -0.014*** -0.034* -0.910*** -7.915** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.020) (0.285) (3.690) 
HH's Kids 6 
and over 
0.018*** 0.016*** -0.101*** 0.908*** -1.156 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.184) (1.957) 
Other Kid's 5 
and under 
0.037***   2.194***  
 (0.009)   (0.560)  
Other Kid's 6 
and Over 
0.020***   1.170***  
 (0.006)   (0.384)  
Wife’s Age 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.120*** 0.844*** 2.338*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.135) (0.614) 
Wife’s Age 
Squared 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.015*** -0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) 
Education 
Highest 
Degree 
Attained 
0.009*** 0.003 0.116*** 0.320*** 19.674*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.018) (0.089) (4.524) 
Log(Wage)    -3.392*** -456.977*** 
    (0.465) (95.210) 
Sigma_cons    30.082***  
    (3.584)  
_cons 0.796*** 0.815*** -2.172*** 18.046*** 37.121* 
 (0.040) (0.057) (0.143) (0.291) (20.059) 
Year and 
Parish Fixed 
Effect 
YES YES YES YES YES 
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R2 0.31 0.30    
N 5,537 5,533 18,246 5,537 5,533 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
 Finally, we examine the effects of remittances on the labor market behavior of single 
men.  For this group, remittances have the largest effect on labor force participation.  A $1,000 
increase in remittances, after instrumenting with the average remittances received by other 
households in the enumeration district, decreases the probability of working in the IV probit 
model by 0.109 (that is 0.272/2.5).  Comparing two similar single men, one receiving $2,000 in 
remittances is 20 percent less likely to work as one not receiving remittances.  Conditional on 
working, the level of remittances once again does not significantly affect the hours worked. 
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Table 20  
Single Males 
Model used LPM IV OLS IV 
PROBIT 
TOBIT IV TOBIT 
Dependent 
Variable 
LFP LFP LFP  Hours of 
Work 
Hours of 
Work 
Imputed Total 
Remittances (In 
000’s of USD) 
-0.011*** -0.066*** -0.272*** -0.482 -7.951 
 (0.003) (0.020) (0.088) (0.517) (7.681) 
Property Income 0.006** 0.003 0.018 0.577*** 2.965** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.017) (0.115) (1.258) 
HH's Kids 5 and 
under 
-0.025 -0.019 -0.156 -1.866 -3.224 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.245) (1.348) (16.513) 
HH's Kids 6 and 
over 
0.062*** 0.068*** 0.519*** 4.466*** 15.217*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.097) (0.489) (3.911) 
Other Kid's 5 and 
under 
-0.051**   -3.555***  
 (0.021)   (0.928)  
Other Kid's 6 and 
Over 
-0.036***   -0.693  
 (0.013)   (0.855)  
Wife’s Age 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.012* 0.363*** -0.895** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.137) (0.369) 
Wife’s Age 
Squared 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.009*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
Education 
Highest Degree 
Attained 
0.008** 0.062 0.210 0.629*** 21.593 
 (0.004) (0.049) (0.203) (0.226) (16.997) 
Log(Wage)    -6.714*** -338.486*** 
    (0.750) (59.380) 
Sigma_cons    32.036***  
    (2.863)  
_cons 0.812*** 0.817*** 1.130*** 21.449*** 56.121*** 
 (0.042) (0.056) (0.199) (0.329) (14.467) 
Year and Parish 
Controls 
YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.24 0.13    
N 3,552 3,550 3,550 3,552 3,550 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
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Nonlinear Effect of Remittances 
 Imputation of remittances has failed to significantly change the results, but perhaps this is 
due to a nonlinear effect of remittances.  In this section, we take the natural log of remittances, 
and again estimate instrumented versions of the linear probability and probit models for labor 
force participation and tobit for hours worked.  Results are located in Table 21. 
 Even after changing the functional form of remittances, we still find that the variable 
does not significantly affect labor market behavior of women in long-term relationships.  This 
holds true when we look at labor force participation and hours worked and whether we 
instrument for remittances and not.  Although this suggests that this particular transformation of 
remittances does not reveal any additional information, it cannot rule out the possibility of other 
nonlinear effects.  
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Table 21  
Nonlinear Effects of Remittances 
Model 
Used 
LPM IV OLS IV PROBIT TOBIT IV TOBIT 
Dependent 
Variable 
LFP LFP LFP  Hours of 
Work 
Hours of Work 
Log of 
Wife’s 
Wage 
   -23.314*** -436.115*** 
    (1.103) (37.987) 
Log of 
Imputed 
Total 
Remittances 
(In 000’s of 
USD) 
-0.007 -0.001 -0.005 0.082 2.801 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.021) (0.492) (1.740) 
Property 
Income  
0.002** 0.003** 0.008** 0.406*** 3.271*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.081) (0.475) 
Wife’s 
Education 
(Highest 
Degree) 
0.034*** 0.028*** 0.125*** 2.860*** 16.869*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.027) (0.134) (1.973) 
HH's Kids 5 
and under 
-0.101*** -0.101*** -0.283*** -7.073*** -5.426* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.029) (0.680) (2.818) 
HH's Kids 6 
and over 
0.021*** 0.021*** 0.052*** 0.862** -1.427 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.403) (1.468) 
Other Kid's 
5 and under 
0.011   0.465  
 (0.013)   (0.686)  
Other Kid's 
6 and Over 
-0.007   -0.670  
 (0.009)   (0.603)  
Wife’s Age 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.040*** 1.133*** 0.093 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.229) (0.452) 
Wife’s Age 
Squared 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.018*** -0.007 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) 
Sigma_cons    29.195***  
    (0.312)  
_cons 0.564*** 0.638*** 0.308 5.776 32.547** 
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 (0.056) (0.066) (0.216) (5.728) (13.677) 
Year and 
Parish 
Controls 
YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.15 0.15    
N 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,510 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
 
 
   
Conclusion 
We began this essay interested in the effects of remittances on labor supply of married 
women (or those in long-term relationships) in developing countries such as Jamaica.  Reliance 
on remittances, particularly in a small country such as Jamaica with significant emigration to the 
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom., can comprise a significant share of a 
household’s income, thus affecting decisions such as labor market participation and hours 
worked.  To the extent that a relationship between labor market outcomes and remittances exists, 
it is important to understand the direction of this relationship and whether it could create greater 
implications for economic growth in developing countries. 
 Surprisingly, in the models instrumenting for remittances, we find that remittances do no 
significantly affect participation in the labor market for females in relationships.  That is, there is 
no difference in the probability of working based on the level of remittances received by a 
female in a long-term relationship, ceteris paribus.  When we consider this effect for other 
demographic groups, we find that there is a small negative effect for married men and single 
females, but the effect for single men is by far the most surprising.  It could be that these men are 
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more likely working in informal jobs that they fail to report or engage in home production 
(farming), and thus we see greater effects of remittances for this demographic group. 
 Conditional on working, remittances either have no statistically significant or a small 
positive effect on hours worked, challenging earlier findings.  This suggests that remittances are 
likely correlated with health or labor market conditions that are also correlated with hours 
worked.  Once we include the appropriate instruments that remove these effects from our 
estimation, we find that remittances no longer cause a reduction in hours worked.  
Findings in this paper are an improvement over results in previous studies for several 
reasons.  First, we consider both the decision to work (labor force participation) and hours 
worked separately.  Second, we recognize the endogeneity of remittances in labor market 
outcomes, and thus choose models that account for this endogeneity.  Although we use a 
relatively simple model, we believe this essay contributes substance to the discussion of 
remittances by focusing specifically on the labor market decisions of females in relationships and 
then introducing other demographic groups separately.   
This essay offers clear insight into the research question, but at the same time, introduces 
new related research questions.  For example, why do remittances not affect labor market 
participation for many of the demographic groups?  What would happen in communities if there 
was an exogenous drop in remittance flows?  Remittances are treated linearly in this essay with 
the exception of one set of regressions in which they are logged, but is there perhaps a different 
nonlinear relationship that should further be explored?  More specifically, is there some 
threshold effect, at which point households change behavior after reaching this threshold but do 
not change behavior before.  Although answering a different question, researchers may be 
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interested in the effects of remittances on the labor supply of those sending remittances as 
opposed to those receiving the money. That is, are migrants remitting money more likely to work 
overtime or moonlight with a second job compared to migrants not remitting funds?  How does 
this affect the host country if the remittance senders reside abroad?  Remittance senders may also 
reside in major urban areas in Jamaica.  Are work efforts in the urban centers increased at the 
expense of productivity in the outskirts?   
Given the significance of remittances to the Jamaican economy, related studies in the future 
may consider the effects of direct taxation of remittances.  This research documents the effects of 
remittances on labor supply, but wages earned while working in Jamaica are subject to income 
tax.  Individuals receiving remittances from abroad in lieu of formal labor, however, do not pay 
similar taxes, thus creating an element of horizontal inequality in the labor market. Taxing 
remittances, however, is not straightforward.  Individuals working and sending remittances from 
within Jamaica may already be paying income taxes.  Secondly, even those remittances from 
abroad may be used for investment.  They can also be used on consumption purchases that 
generate sales tax for the government.  The key issue is whether remittances increase 
consumption above that level possible had there been less remittances but greater labor supply 
and earned income.  
The relationship between remittances and labor supply is an important one, but as this 
essay demonstrates, the most notable effect may be that there is none, at least for the group of 
women in long-term relationships.  If remittances do not affect labor behavior for most heads of 
household, the next question is, do they have any effect on other household decisions.  In the 
next chapter, we further explore the effects of remittances, this time analyzing the effect of 
remittances on household consumption and budget allocation. 
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Chapter Two:  Consumption Effects Of Foreign Remittances 
Economists have long used measures such as GDP per capita to gauge the economic 
growth of a country.  Household income is a similar concept, intended to measure the standard of 
living for a family.  While income levels enable researchers to better understand the consumption 
bundles available to households, alone, it fails to describe exactly how households allocate their 
income and what they choose to consume. 
We study consumption because consumption can predict future growth.  Public finance 
economists are interested in consumption for another reason – because consumption serves as the 
base for sales tax revenues, a large contributor to government revenues in many countries.  These 
qualities establish consumption as an important concept, worthy of analysis in this paper.   
In predicting or analyzing consumption, classical economic theory suggested that it was 
total income – and not the source of income – that mattered.  Recent research, discussed later in 
this paper, presents evidence that the source of income does affect consumption decisions.  In 
this paper, we further develop the idea that the source of income matters and ask the question, 
how does the receipt of remittances or other outside income affect expense decisions by recipient 
households?   
In the first paper, the level of remittances was highlighted.  In this paper, we follow 
previous research (Adams, 2006; Hawkins & Wallace, 2006) and examine the effect that the 
share of total income received from outside of the household has on household consumption.  
Remittances may come from family members working in other parts of Jamaica or abroad and 
could be sent to support children or for the household in general.    Approximately 60 percent of 
Jamaican households report receiving remittances from at least one source, averaging $452 per 
household. 
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Remittances are a significant source of income for households in many developing 
countries, but for Jamaica, an English-speaking, developing country located close to the United 
States, dependence on remittances is particularly strong.  The country ranks among the top five 
in terms of per capita remittance flows and in the top ten in terms of remittances as a percentage 
of GDP.
9
  The reliance may result from the emigration of Jamaica’s college educated citizens.  
Four out of five college-educated Jamaicans live abroad.
10
  With considerable migration and 
remittance flows (coupled with the availability of data), Jamaica is a reasonable choice for study 
of how remittances affect consumption decisions by households.  For a description of remittance 
trends in Jamaica, see Figure 1 in the Motivation section of Chapter 1, Labor Market Effects of 
Foreign Remittances. 
Understanding the effect of remittances on consumption is important for the following 
reason.  If remittances are found to significantly alter the expenditure patterns of recipient 
households, we might assess whether or not changes are favorable for future income growth.  For 
example, do we find that households receiving remittances spend more on education, or are they 
spending greater shares of income on luxury expenditures such as eating out or vices like 
tobacco and gambling?   
It is plausible that the receipt of remittances affects household decisions in addition to 
consumption, but from a microeconomic perspective, the two topics addressed in this dissertation 
– consumption and labor supply (in the previous essay) – are arguably the most important.  To 
analyze the effect of remittances on consumption, this paper is organized as follows.  First, we 
briefly describe the context of Jamaica.  Greater detail was presented in the first essay, but brief 
                                                          
9
 (http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=137#3, accessed on June 8, 2011.) 
10
 (http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/jamaica,  accessed on June 8, 2011.) 
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discussion in this essay is still warranted.  Then, we describe existing research on remittances 
and consumption and provide ways in which our own research might advance the field.  Having 
discussed the existing literature, we use previous research and our own a prior beliefs to 
construct a theoretical model explaining the possible effects of remittance receipts on utility and 
consumption.  In this section, we also describe our hypotheses as to what might affect 
remittances and consumption.  Our methodological approach is outlined, and then data is 
presented and summarized.  Finally, we present results, summarize findings, and discuss the 
implications.  
Background on Jamaica 
A lengthy discussion in the first essay described the immigration and remittance process 
in the country of Jamaica.  In this essay, we focus more on those topics most pertinent in a 
discussion of remittances and consumption. 
Jamaica may seem like an easy choice as a case study given the availability of data, but 
aside from this reason, this small developing country is a strong candidate for analysis.  
Remittances comprise a significant portion of GDP (almost one-fifth), and the country ranks 10
th
 
in terms of remittances to GDP.
11
  Also, it consistently ranks among the top five in terms of 
remittances per capita.  Once known for its attractiveness to tourists and abundant natural 
resources, remittances now exceed tourism revenues and the value of bauxite exportation 
combined.   
We often assume that most remittances are financial, and while this may be the case, the 
value of in-kind remittances should not be ignored.  Unfortunately, the value of in-kind 
remittances may be harder to measure.  Recipeints do not recall everything they received, do not 
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 (http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=137#3, accessed on June 8, 2011.) 
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want to report everything, or cannot accurately determine the values of gifts received.  Earlier 
versions of of the Survey of Living Conditions (SLC) did not ask respondents to provide much 
detail on remittances, but due to efforts by faculty at the University of the West Indies, the SLC 
was modified in 2006 to include a special module on remittances. In addition to the usual 
question of how much is received in total from cash and in-kind transfers, this special module 
explicitly breaks down remittances by cash and in-kind on the survey questionnaire.  If a 
household receives in-kind gifts, such as food items or clothing, this will likely affect a 
household’s allocation of expensese (no longer needing to spend as much on food or clothing, for 
example).  Such gifts also affect GCT (General Consumption Tax) revenues.  When someone 
abroad sends a pair of shoes and they are not taxed by Jamaica’s government, GCT is lower than 
if the same person abroad had sent money for the purchase of shoes from a tax-paying retailer in 
Jamaica.  One study places the mode of cash remittances over $300 (USD) and the mode of in 
kind goods between $60 and $100 (USD) (Dade, 2006). 
Remittances are not the only source of non-wage income in Jamaica.  Two programs, the 
Program of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH) and the National Insurance 
Scheme (NIS), also provide unearned income to Jamaican households.  PATH is available to the 
neediest Jamaican households and is contingent upon parents sending their children to school 
and getting proper medical attention for all household members.  The National Insurance Scheme 
is similar to social security in the United States.  Both programs are described in detail in the first 
essay.   
We mention the above programs because they, too, could have significant effects on 
households’ expense allocations.  As a result, income from these sources will be included as 
additional controls in all estimations.  Before we present the model and results, however, it is 
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important to review existing research on the determinants of household consumption and 
specifically, the effects of outside or unearned income.  
Expenditures in Jamaica 
Thus far, the context of Jamaica has been discussed on the remittances and income side, 
but additional information on the expenditures and culture in Jamaica is also important.  Unlike 
in the United States, in which public school is available to students free of charge through age 
18, Jamaica’s educational system is significantly different.  Early childhood and primary school 
(through age 12) is free to students, although students must wear specific uniforms purchased by 
the household.  Transportation is also an issue for many students.  At the early childhood level, 
most students can walk to school, weather permitting.  In poor weather or in case of un-walkable 
distances, students must secure their own transportation to schools.  After age 12, public schools 
charge tuition, uniforms are still required, students generally require transportation to attend 
larger schools further from home, and students are required to buy textbooks.  All of these 
expenses increase the cost of attending school in Jamaica.  Attending school is still required by 
law, but little is done to enforce this law.  The expense of school may explain why of the adult 
population (ages 15 and above), the literacy rate is only 86 percent overall and 80 percent for 
males, according to World Health Organization estimates.
12
  
Jamaica’s Human Development Index as of 2007 was 0.766, and the Human Poverty 
Index Rank for Developing Countries was 10.9.  Total expenditures on health account for just 
over five percent of GDP, while health expenditures comprise only 2.6 percent of the general 
government expenditures.  Ninety-three percent of the population has sustainable access to 
drinking water, although only eighty-three percent live with access to improved sanitation. 
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 (http://www.who.int/en/, accessed on November 14, 2008) 
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On average, Jamaicans 15 and older consume over four liters of pure alcohol annually, 
mostly in the form of spirits.  Alcohol disorders account for just under three percent of male 
deaths per year.  In 1992, the most recent year for which the country reported figures on BMI, 
the prevalence of overweight and obesity in the older population (ages 60 and above) was more 
than 30 percent, and it is likely that that number has increased in the last twenty years.  In 2000, 
five percent of females between 15 and 49 indicated in a survey that they had been diagnosed by 
a health professional as suffering from diabetes.  Again, it is likely that the true rate of incidence 
is much higher.  In the United States, where obesity is also a health concern, 5 percent of 
individuals between 45 and 49 self-report diabetes, but the rate is much lower for those in the 
younger age brackets (15-44). 
Tobacco use is also a concern in Jamaica.  Although the statistics on the World Health 
Organization’s website are only for youth ages 13-15, the numbers for 2006 are staggering.  
Twenty-two percent of children in this range report being current users of tobacco products, and 
over a third have used tobacco products in the past.  Males are more likely than females, with 43 
percent of males between the ages of 13 and 15 reporting previous use of tobacco products.  To 
put this in perspective, of individuals between 18 and 24 in the United States, 24 percent are 
current users of tobacco products.  These numbers do not include drug use, either, where Jamaica 
is known for its production of substances such as marijuana. 
The health statistics for Jamaica help paint a picture of Jamaican life and potential 
expenditures.  With the amount of smoking, for example, we expect relatively higher 
expenditures on tobacco than we would in a country where inhabitants do not engage in 
smoking.  At the same time, the expenditures should be less than a country where smoking has 
become an epidemic.  Does money from abroad encourage such a habit, with negative effects on 
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long-term health and economic productivity? Similarly, the availability of drinking water likely 
relates to the household’s expenses on water, and health concerns affect expenditures on health 
care. 
Understanding the overall health, education, and culture of Jamaica aids in the 
interpretation of estimations of expenditure shares, and specifically, the effect of remittances on 
such decisions.  In the next section, we examine previous research on consumption, and begin to 
formulate hypotheses as to how remittances affect household allocation of resources. 
Consumption Studies 
Studies and commentary on consumption date as far back as the discipline itself.  Adam 
Smith, in his chapter on the division of stock, classifies immediate consumption as part of the 
“first division” of resources (Smith, 1979). Consumption, again, was a prominent feature of 
research immediately after the great depression and forms one of the key components of the 
aggregate demand analysis, popularized by John Maynard Keynes. Building on Keynes’ 
analysis, researchers developed a number of consumption theories, namely, the life cycle 
theorem (Modigliani & Ando, 1957; Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954), permanent income 
hypothesis (Friedman, 1957) and more recently, the behavioral life cycle theory (Shefrin & 
Thaler, 1988).  
Consumption, even in microeconomics, is usually aggregated over many different goods 
and over households as opposed to individuals. Not only is consumption usually aggregated, but 
so, too, is income.  Several scholars have pointed out the need to use income by source for 
macroeconomic studies (Kaldor, 1955; Taylor, 1971), but this sentiment is rarely repeated for 
consumption research, at least in macroeconomics.  In microeconomic research, the need to 
disaggregate consumption occasionally emerges. In fact, several authors have pointed out that 
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there are differences in the propensity to save across different types of goods (Davies, et al., 
2009; Hawkins & Wallace, 2006; Levin, 1998). 
Levin (1998) uses different asset types to measure the lifecycle behavior of consumption 
in a household-level study. He uses data from the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey 
(RHS) to create 8 different expenditure categories and 5 different asset classes. His results 
support the behavioral life-cycle
13
 model of consumption as opposed to the standard life-cycle 
theory even after accounting for liquidity constraints. Davies et al (2009) also disaggregates both 
consumption and income into multiple categories (Davies, et al., 2009).  They find results similar 
to Levin; that MPC varies across income sources and also across different types of consumption 
goods. Another paper by Hawkins and Wallace (2006) considers separate income sources and 
consumption types and finds that the prices of commodities are affected by the production costs, 
psychic costs, and transaction costs associated with the income source. 
 Fungibility of Income 
The papers mentioned above not only created consumption categories but also asset 
categories.  This work deviates from classical economic theory which suggests that only 
permanent income affects consumption decisions by the household, a result of classical and 
neoclassical foundations. Transitory income, such as welfare payments and monetary gifts, 
including remittances, do not affect the allocation of households’ income (Hall, 1978). Income is 
assumed fungible, and the level of income, not the source of income, determines what 
households consume. Such assertions may have been acceptable historically, but now with the 
                                                          
13
 Life-cycle theory claims that individuals base their consumption on their life-time income. Behavioral life-cycle 
theory goes further by claiming that not all income are treated the same and because of mental account 
individuals base consumption on whether or not the income source is safe or risky. 
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rise of behavioral economics, more economists are thinking about the psychic component of 
income sources (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; Thaler, 1990). 
A number of articles (Carriker, Langemeier, Schroeder, & Featherstone, 1993; Davies, et 
al., 2009; Hawkins & Wallace, 2006; Levine, 1998; Thaler, 1990; Whitaker, 2009) tackled the 
idea of income fungibility within households.  Thaler (1990) takes a theoretical approach while 
the remaining studies used survey data to conduct rigorous empirical investigations.  Thus far, it 
seems unanimous that the fungibility hypothesis is partially rejected. In most cases the trade-off 
elasticities are not equal to one, suggesting that some but not all income shifts with the 
introduction of income from an outside source. 
Of all the relevant papers, Davies et al (2009) is perhaps the most relevant to this study.  
The authors focus on remittances and the effect this income has on consumption decisions.  They 
collect income and expenditure data in Malawi and analyze the effects that remittances have on 
expenditures, noting significant differences in expenses based on the level of remittances 
received.  While the study is interesting, there may be an empirical flaw that we cannot ignore.  
The authors, like most others in this line of research, treat remittances as exogenous.  It is 
possible, however, that remittances are endogenous.  Suppose remittances are sent for specific 
purposes in an amount that exceeds what is normally spent on a particular category of goods.  
For example, money may be sent to take a sick child to the doctor.  We observe different levels 
of medical spending in households based on remittances, when it was some unobserved factor 
that caused both the remittances and expenses in that category to increase.  Failure to consider 
the endogeneity of remittances in an empirical model could produce biased results, but more 
importantly, it affects predictions of how future remittance streams might be allocated within 
households.     
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From both a theoretical and empirical perspective, recent developments suggest that 
income is not as fungible as we once thought, and we need to look at the different sources of 
income when trying to explain household behavior.  In other words, if a household receives a 
payment designated for food expenditures, older theories would suggest that the effects on 
consumption are equivalent to an equal increase in take-home pay.  Even classifying all earned 
income together may not be ideal, as some researchers have documented differences based on 
which member of the household earns the income (Martin Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, 
& Lechene, 1994).  To be fair, classical economics developed during a time when there was less 
outside income and only one individual in the household earned much of the household’s 
income.    
Changes in household income composition and  advancements in economic theory have 
led scholars interested in consumption decisions to consider differential impacts of multiple 
income sources including welfare payments (Carriker, et al., 1993; Whitaker, 2009), labor 
income, retirement and non-retirement income, and capital income (Hawkins & Wallace, 2006), 
bonuses and windfalls (Thaler, 1990), tax rebates (Shapiro & Slemrod, 2003) and remittances 
(Davies, et al., 2009).  Most of these studies conclude, or at least imply, that the households’ 
marginal propensity to consume and their specific spending decisions vary according to the 
source of income.  
 More recent behavioral life cycle models incorporate risk and uncertainty, which serve to 
differentiate the various sources of income. For instance, the marginal propensity to save may be 
high (and marginal propensity to consume low) for income from windfall profits if the recipient 
perceives that the probability of again receiving this income is near zero.  This argument easily 
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extends to recipients of remittances if they believe the flow of money will continue or if there 
was a one time (or infrequent) influx of remittance funds. 
If the source of income affects the marginal propensity to consume, we can also question 
whether it affects what we purchase.  Economists frequently treat consumption as a bundle of 
goods and services, lumping together all purchases into one basket. However, a second 
possibility is to consider whether marginal propensities to consume differ across consumption 
categories, in which case scholars examine a disaggregated consumption measure.  In other 
words, not only do we expect marginal propensities to consume to vary for different sources of 
income, but they may also vary for different categories of goods (Davies, et al., 2009; Hawkins 
& Wallace, 2006; Levin, 1998).  
The consumption bundle selected by a household is important, as some bundles may be 
more conducive to a country’s economic growth than others.  For example, is the household 
sending children to school or spending money on unnecessary items?  We know that food 
expenditures are important, too.  Using data from the Bangladesh National Survey (1981-1982), 
scholars find a link between expenditures on food, total caloric intake, and productivity  (Pitt, 
Rosenweig, & Hassan, 1990) with greater implications for economic development.  If 
individuals receiving remittances spend this money on food, this could produce more positive 
outcomes for the country than expenditures on other items.    
 For individuals sending remittances, we might think that their intent is to fund expenses 
with more positive outcomes, such as food, health, or education.  If this is the case, then not only 
might we expect to see differences in expenditures by income source, but to see more “positive” 
expenditures for those receiving remittances relative to those not receiving some form of 
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remittances.  On the other hand, it is possible that households are more careless with funds they 
do not have to earn by working.  They could use this money disproportionately for alcohol or 
tobacco, expenditures that would lower productivity over time.  Fortunately, we hypothesize that, 
on average, the positive expenses are more likely to occur as senders of remittances are likely to 
monitor the expenses habits or recipients and punish family members for misallocating funds. 
Individuals versus Families–Sharing Rules  
The idea that some types of expenses are more desirable than others is one reason to 
study a disaggregated consumption, but other reasons are also important.  Probably one of the 
most important reasons why we should look at disaggregated consumption is because 
preferences for different goods vary even among family members. For example, some members 
of the household may think education is extremely important, thus generating greater school 
expenses, while other members of household think properly maintaining the house or vehicles is 
a priority. Similarly, discount rates may vary among family members, affecting the balance of 
durable and non-durable purchases.  Research by Chiappori, Bourguignon and Browning (1994, 
1998) suggests ways to analyze individual preferences when the data is only available for the 
household (Martin Browning, et al., 1994; M. Browning & Chiappori, 1998). This involves 
viewing the household utility maximization decision as efficient, meaning the household can 
achieve no greater welfare than that reached with the current choices of consumption (and 
leisure) bundles. We could further expect Kaldor-Hicks efficiency within the household, where 
members are compensated when a purchase is not their preference or bargaining occurs between 
household members.   
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In the following section, we incorporate knowledge of sharing rules along with advances 
in the previously discussed literature to develop a behavior life-cycle model for remittances and 
consumption. 
Theoretical Model 
Behavioral Life-cycle Model 
There are at least three theories that economists have developed to explain the 
relationship between consumption and income-the life-cycle theory (Modigliani & Ando, 1957; 
Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954), the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957), and the 
newest addition, the behavioral life-cycle model (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; Thaler, 1990).  The 
life-cycle theory is defined as a process where individuals are assumed to choose the optimal 
amount of consumption and savings by solving a multi-period dynamic programming problem. 
This leads to the concept of consumption smoothing, where individuals, anticipating increases or 
decreases to income in the future, spend more or less to essentially smooth their yearly 
consumption over their lives.  For example, middle aged individuals consume less now to save 
for retirement in the future.  College students accumulate student loans and credit card debt 
under the assumption that they will earn more in the future.  Instead of focusing on current 
income, individuals use projections of their life-time earnings when making expense decisions.   
Included in this theory is the idea that households behave on expectations of total income and do 
not care about the particular source of income. 
The permanent income hypothesis is a simplified version of the life-cycle theory, where 
the focus is taken off of retirement saving decisions and placed on permanent income. Here 
permanent income is the average long-term income of infinitely lived households as opposed to 
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life-time income.
14
   Therefore, instead of saying the marginal propensity to consume is higher 
for poor (usually younger) individuals, we say the marginal propensity to consume is higher for 
individuals with low permanent income (ignoring transitory or temporary windfall income). In 
essence, both theories of consumption arrive at identical predictions with the permanent income 
hypothesis being more generally applicable. Both theories predict that the MPC is the same for 
the same individual over all time. They also predict that the MPC is the same regardless of the 
source of income. That is they predict that income is fungible.  
Several authors who support the life-cycle view have made changes to the initial 
framework to explain empirical findings not supportive of the traditional life-cycle and 
permanent income hypotheses. This includes assumptions on the borrowing limit or liquidity 
constraints faced by consumers, relaxing the assumption that they can borrow infinitely from the 
future. Other changes in the assumptions of the framework are uncertainty of future employment, 
income and life expectancy. 
Other scholars are less sympathetic to the traditional models of consumption and point to 
flaws in the theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; Thaler, 1990). Firstly, they point to bounded 
rationality and the inability of people to make perfectly rational decisions. People lack 
information and improperly discount the future, implying that individual agents are not 
sophisticated enough to behave as rationally as the traditional life cycle theories predict.   
Second, the same set of scholars suggests that most consumers do not exhibit the patience and 
self-control necessary to save for periods with expected lower incomes, thus failing to smooth 
                                                          
14
 For the life-cycle theory the household is finite-lived and saves for retirement. The permanent income 
hypothesis assumes households live infinitely by leaving bequests for children.  
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consumption over the life cycle.  To accommodate these inconsistencies, the behavioral life-
cycle theory was introduced. 
The behavioral life-cycle theory allows for mental accounting and framing by the 
consumers. Consumers are allowed to incorporate psychic costs into their spending decisions. 
They are also allowed to be impatient, letting the savings rate fluctuate over time and across 
income types. The theory assumes that people consider three things when making consumption 
and savings decisions – current income, current assets, and future income (Shefrin & Thaler, 
1988). Current income provides the greatest incentive to spend.  Current assets are valuable but 
less liquid, and future income is plagued by uncertainty.   
An income source like remittances probably contributes to current income, and thus we 
are likely to see more of it spent than saved.  Money is not automatically withheld for savings, 
although a significant portion of remittances are already lost to the sender and recipient via fees 
charged by transfer agents such as Western Union.  While it is possible that recipients view 
remittances differently from other income because it came at a sacrifice – the absence of the 
family member who is working elsewhere – it is likely the case that money is used to meet 
immediate needs rather than savings.  The decision to even send someone away to work is 
possibly motivated by immediate need, and as is the case in more developed countries, lower 
income populations are unlikely to earn (or receive) enough to comfortably place remittances 
into any type of savings or retirement plans.  At the same time, it is possible that some people 
work in developed countries and send money to their home country for investment purposes, 
such as the construction of a house.  This form of monetary flow may explain why remittance 
figures from the Bank of Jamaica are so great, but because this money is intended as an 
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investment on the behalf of the sender, the respondent fails to report it as remittances available to 
the recipient’s household.  
If we assume that respondents are only reporting receipt of income that is available for 
them to spend and the assumption that recipients are determined by immediate need, the 
household’s problem is: 
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where tE  is the expectations operator at time t,   is the constant discount factor,  C  is 
consumption of goods and services at ,  and L  is leisure at .  In the budget constraint 1p  and 
2p  are the first and second period prices, r  is the interest rate, t is the income tax rate, W is the 
wage rate, T is the amount of time available to the head of household for labor or leisure, and N
is all non-labor income, including remittances. 
The Lagrangian is given as 
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The first order conditions from (1) are: 
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 These yield the following equilibrium conditions:  
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 The static equation states that agents maximize utility when the ratio of their marginal 
utility of leisure to the marginal utility of consumption equals their real purchasing power (the 
ratio of after-tax income to the price level).  If wage increases, for example, the right hand side 
of the static equation increases.  The left hand side must also increase, suggesting that either the 
marginal utility of leisure increases (consume less leisure) or the marginal utility of consumption 
decreases (consume more), assuming both are normal goods and subject to diminishing marginal 
utility.  If wages increase, not changing current consumption or leisure and saving all additional 
income for future consumption is not maximizing utility. 
 The Euler equation provides a solution for the intertemporal model.  It suggests that there 
exists an optimal path on which an individual cannot increase utility further by forgoing 
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consumption in the current time period, investing the money in an account that pays interest rate 
r, and using the money in the future (Mankiw, Rotemberg, & Summers, 1986).  Substituting (19) 
and (20) into the budget constraint yields the solved out consumption function, which can be 
represented as (Carriker, 1993): 
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where, C is consumption, Y st  is income in time t from income source s, W is a measure of 
wealth and 
1
 is short-run marginal propensity to consume from all sources. The long-run 
MPC
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(26) 
where sw is average ratio of wealth to income from source s (Carriker, et al., 1993).   
At least one scholar has suggested that the concept of a “long-run MPC” might not be 
fundamentally valid (Carroll, et al., 2006) because in the long-run, the amount of wealth or 
income is endogenous in the consumption equation. Like claimed in Carroll et al (2006), what 
we call long-run MPC is really the dynamics of consumption over a few short years (2001-2004), 
hence it is more a medium term phenomenon and more likely to be “constant”.  
Equation in (25) does not account for income from multiple sources, thus a more 
appropriate model is: 
                                                          
15
 Alternative formulas for the calculation of the long-run MPC exists, such as in (Carroll, Otsuka, Slacalek, & 
National Bureau of Economic, 2006) 
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 WCYC ttsstsst ss  31210     for 
each s=1,…,Z. 
(27) 
where  s  is the share of total consumption that is purchased using income from source S. The 
sum of the lambdas over s is equal to one.  There are Z such individual equations for each source 
of income.  As Carriker et al (1993) points out, empirical estimation of each of these equations is 
not possible since the lambdas are unknown.  One way to proceed is to sum over the different 
income sources, which leads to the following estimable equation: 
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 Equation (28) forms the basis of the models we run in later sections. 
 
Budget Shares 
An alternative representation of the consumption function in (28) is using budget shares 
(Deaton & Muellbauer, 1991; Hawkins & Wallace, 2006) from which Engel equations can be 
derived to test the differences in the MPC across goods.  
The empirical approach is fully parametric as we use a standard Engel curve which has 
expenditure on various goods as a function of total income while controlling for demographic 
and other characteristics of the household. While there are different possible functional forms 
that can be used, we opt to use the most commonly used linear function of Working (1943)  
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(Working, 1943). There are some advantages to using this approach, one of which is that it is 
consistent with the adding up restriction in demand analysis.  That is, 
            (
 
 ⁄ )                                                (29) 
where, ∑     ∑         ∑    , αi=1, and βi=0. 
When the individual expenditures are transformed into budget shares and total income is 
transformed to its log, the joint density is approximately normal, which means the regression 
function can be treated as linear.  The simple Working Engle curve can be extended to include 
various household characteristics as control variables, as well as indicators of the various income 
sources of interest. 
          (
 
 ⁄ )  ∑          ( )                                (30) 
where, wi is the share of budget spent of good i; Y is total disposable income; dij represents 
dummy variables for non-labor income sources; n is household size; Xi includes age (of the head 
of the household), age squared, urban area, and household size and ui is the error term. 
Theoretical Relationships between Budget Shares and Remittances 
 Thus far, we have presented arguments as to why remittances as an outside income might 
affect consumption, but we have not been specific as to how specific categories of expenditures 
might be affected by remittances.  In this section, we hypothesize about the effect of remittances 
on categories of spending reported in the surveys used and explain our rationale. 
The first expenditure category is education related expenses, and the effect of remittances 
on the share of budget spent on school expenditure is expected to be positive. This is because of 
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conditions usually attached to remittances, which may informally state that the money must be 
spent towards a child’s education. 
Home maintenance is a similar type expense.  Money may be requested for repairs and 
improvements, and thus we expect a positive relationship between reliance on remittances and 
the share of expenses devoted to this category.  Households requesting funds from relatives 
abroad for specific purposes may be held accountable if remittances are used for other items.  As 
such, an increase in the share of income received from remittances is expected to increase the 
share of expenses in each of these categories, ceteris paribus.  
Other categories may be negatively affected as dependence on remittances increases.  For 
example, individuals sending remittances may not want to support bad habits (vices) such as 
smoking and gambling, or luxury expenses, such as eating out or salon services.  As such, even 
when controlling for total income, increased reliance on remittances decreases the share of 
expenses on these items.  Total spending in these areas may increase with an increase in income, 
but the rate of the increase in spending on these categories is less than the increase in 
expenditures, and thus the budget shares fall. 
Other categories, such as grocery story purchases, water, or electricity, could exhibit 
positive or negative effects between remittances and budget shares.  Controlling for income, it 
could be the case that remittances are sent specifically for these purposes, and thus we would 
anticipate a positive relationship between the share of remittance income and budget shares for 
these items.  However, these items could also be considered necessities, in which case the source 
of income is irrelevant.  Controlling for income, expenses on water remain the same regardless 
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of whether the income is earned or remitted.  This hypothesis follows the older life-cycle 
hypothesis. 
The effect of income on budget shares provides a slightly different set of hypotheses.  
Expenditures on items such as education, health, luxuries like eating out, and vices such as 
smoking and gambling, are all expected to increase with income, ceteris paribus.  Other expenses 
may increase or decrease, but at a slower rate than income, resulting in negative relationships 
between income and budget shares.  For example, expenses on water may reach an optimal level, 
at which point no increase in income would increase water level further.  The same could be said 
for electricity.  In the case of food, increases in income may result in more eating out, less home 
production, and less grocery store purchases.  Of course, it is also possible that grocery store 
purchases increase as home production slows, so even this effect is a bit ambiguous.  
A full list of the expected effects of remittance share of income and total income on the 
budget shares is given in Table 22. 
Table 22 
 Expected Signed of Key Parameters on Budget Shares 
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The Methodology 
Traditionally, the estimation of Engel curve equations uses OLS regressions of budget 
shares on the log of total expenditures (Deaton, 1997; Deaton & Muellbauer, 1991; Subramanian 
& Deaton, 1996). While this is acceptable for food expenditures in which few households report 
zero spending, it may not be appropriate for other budget shares with a disproportionate number 
of zeros. The fractional nature of the data also cannot be ignored if we want to predict values for 
the dependent variable (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996, 2008).  Ramalho and Da Silva (2009) 
suggest the use of a two-part model able to handle extreme bunching at the endpoints (0 or 1) 
within the fractional response models of Papke and Wooldridge (Ramalho & Da Silva, 2009) . 
This approach is applicable given the budget shares we consider.  The following serves as an 
explanation of the method and how we implement this approach.    
We begin with the basic conditional function, 
E (Y⁄X) = Xβ         (31) 
where, Y is the budget share of the various expenditure types given in Table (26), and the 
regression equivalent to Equation (30). If OLS is used, there is no guarantee that predictions of 
E(Y/X) will fall within the (0,1) interval. Furthermore, the large number of zeros means that  
Equation (31) may be misspecified.
16
 One possible representation is the Tobit specification of 
(31) which is given by, 
 E(Y⁄X)= (    )     (    )       (32) 
                                                          
16
 Even though all models have some form of misspecification as a rule, researchers aim to reduce these 
misspecification as much as possible. 
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where    (.) is the normal distribution function and  (.) is the normal density.   is the standard 
deviation of the error from a latent variable equation (Y*) (not shown) from which (32) is 
derived.  This econometric approach was previously used by (McDonald & Moffitt, 1980) for 
demand analysis, but the Tobit still does not guarantee that the dependent variable will be 
bounded between 0 and 1.  
On the other hand, the log-odds transformation of Y guarantees that the dependent 
variable is between 0 and 1.  Each Y is transformed to log(Y/1-Y) and we have as the condition 
mean 
This equation is then estimated using OLS. The appeal of this transformation is that the 
distribution of the transformed variables resembles a normal distribution, which makes OLS 
regression appropriate. However, the transformation is ad-hoc and not defined if Y is either zero 
or one.  
These issues contributed to the development of the fractional response models proposed 
by Papke and Wooldridge.  
Fractional Response Modeling (FRM) 
The method proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) uses a generalized least squares 
method with no transformation needed for the dependent variable.  The conditional mean takes 
the form  
E(Y⁄X)= (  )           (33) 
where G is a non-linear function.  
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Two-part Fractional Response Model 
 We use the two-part fractional response model proposed by Ramalho and Da Silva 
(2009) to fully account for the large number of zeros observed in the budget shares data.  The 
first part of this model deals with the participation decision: 
Y* = {
 
 
for        
  for   (   ]
      (34) 
where Y* is 0 without participation and 1 otherwise. 
Next, we estimate   (    | ) as a logit model, which in this case, is more appropriate 
than a probit model.  
  (    | )    (  (   ]| )   (  ) (35) 
where F(.) is the cumulative logistic function and   is a vector of parameters. 
This logit model can be estimated using maximum likelihood estimation an data for the 
entire sample (J.S. Ramalho & da Silva, 2009). 
The second part of the model deals with positive amounts of budget shares once a 
decision to participate is made: 
  ( |    (   ])   (  ) (36) 
where  ( )can be any non-linear function,  is identical to the  ( ) in the FRM model in 
(33), and is estimated using the quasi-MLE method.  
 ( | ) can be divided into two parts to reflect 0 and positive budget shares separately: 
 ( | )   ( |     )    (   | )   ( |    (   ])    (  (   ]| )  (37) 
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where,  the first term on the right hand side drops out because it is equal to zero.  From (35) and 
(36), we now have  
E(Y/X) = G(Xγ). F(Xθ)  (38) 
Importantly these two components can be estimated separately since γ and θ are not required to 
be the same. We assume a logistic function
17
 for both models as in (Ramalho & Da Silva, 2009). 
This means: 
  ( | )  
  (   )
(     )(     )
                                         (39) 
 For the participation equation, the marginal effect of Xj is given by: 
    (    | )
   
   
   
(     ) 
 
 
(40) 
 
Conditional on whether a household spends some positive amount on remittances, the marginal 
effect of Xj is given by: 
   ( |    (   ]
   
   
   
(     ) 
 
(41) 
For the marginal effect on all budget shares (whether 0 or positive): 
                                                          
17
 The logistic assumption for G(.) and F(.) is tested using the linktest command in Stata. 
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(42) 
The total effect is therefore disaggregated into (i) the marginal effect on budget share for 
households who report positive amounts of spending, weighted by the probability of 
participating in that expenditure type; and (ii) the marginal effect on probability of participation 
in each expenditure type weighted by the average budget share for those who have positive 
spending on that expenditure type.  
Accounting for Endogeneity of Remittances 
Remittance receipt may be endogenous in the consumption equations. Maybe the most 
important reason is that omitted variables from the budget share equations may be correlated 
with remittances. This is the omitted variables problem. One such variable which is unobserved 
is the recipients’ view of remittances. Is the stream of outside income likely to remain stable or is 
it volatile.  The same way consumption is expected to vary depending on whether income is a 
windfall, so, too, might consumption depend on whether money is a one time or repeated gift.  
Higher remittances may correspond to rarer occurrences, and thus the omitted factor is correlated 
to both the level of remittances and expenditure patterns.  
Authors have used a variety of instruments based on the availability of data. In looking at 
remittances and child labor, Acosta (2006) uses village level characteristics to estimate the 
likelihood of receiving remittances (Acosta 2006). Abdih, Chami Dagher, & Montiel (2008) 
estimate the causal relationship between home country institutions, such as the level corruption 
(Abdih, et al., 2008). They also use an IV procedure, where the instrumental variable is whether 
or not the individual lives in a coastal area. This variable is correlated with remittances through 
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its positive effect on migration, and any effect on corruption would be through variables such as 
per capita income, which are already in the model.  
In a country as geographically small as Jamaica (less than 150 miles long and 50 miles 
wide – slightly smaller than the state of New Jersey), geographical distinctions may be difficult 
to find without some other parameter helping to differentiate areas. Thus, we adopt the following 
strategy.  First, we use data from 2003, a year excluded from earlier analysis due to problems on 
missing data with employment and earned income.  Fortunately, information on reported 
remittances is still available.  By district (a geographic concept determined in part by geography 
and part by population density), we calculate average household remittance receipts.  If the 
average household in the district receives a high level of remittances relative to other districts 
across the country, then all households residing in the district are tagged as being located in an 
area with high migration.  This tag is then tested as an instrument in the following models.     
The two part model discussed above is extended to account for this potential endogeneity. 
In the participation equation, this is achieved by using an instrumental variable probit model 
(IVPROBIT in Stata), a slight departure from the earlier discussion.  Using an IV procedure with 
logit would be preferred given that it would not require the normal distribution assumption, but 
its calculation is much more difficult and is not preferred in empirical research. Initial findings 
(not presented) from the logit and probit estimations of Equation (35) yield similar parameters, 
suggesting that in this application, interchanging from logit to probit should not significantly 
affect results.   
For the second part of the model, we adjust for endogeneity using the two-step IV 
procedure for fractional response models (J.M. Wooldridge, 2010). In the first step, we estimate 
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an OLS regression of remittance share on the instrumental variable and all exogenous variables 
in the model, and save the residuals( ̂). In the second step, we rerun Equation (36), but this time, 
we include the saved residuals from the first step as one of the exogenous variables. If the 
coefficient on  ̂ is significant, then we can reject the null that remittances are exogenous. 
The Data 
Given the interest in the effects of remittances on household consumption, we use two 
data sources, the Survey of Living Conditions (SLC) and the Jamaican Labor Force Survey 
(LFS) to construct a dataset.  These sources are the same as those used in the previous essay, and 
thus discussion of the surveys and their sampling techniques are located in the last chapter.  
Questions about consumption and non-labor income (including remittances) are asked in the 
SLC.  Data on labor income is the only variable from the LFS necessary for our model, and data 
from the two datasets are merged using unique household identification numbers.   
 Using data from 2001-2007, we assess the characteristics of those households receiving 
non-labor income and look at differences in consumption behavior between those families 
receiving and not receiving remittances.  We begin with a general description of households in 
the sample in Table 23.  Note that the first two variables should not be interpreted as shares, 
given that maximum values exceed one and their sum is greater than one.  Instead, these 
variables represent the ratio of remittances or wages to expenditures.  When combined, we see 
that on average, wages and remittances exceed total expenditures by approximately six percent.  
Increases in these values, however, could still be interpreted as increased reliance on remittances 
or earned income. 
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In the next sections, we discuss the issue of outliers and further elaborate on variables 
used in this essay.   
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Table 23  
Descriptive Statistics (Explanatory Variables)  
 Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Remittances to Total Expenditure Ratio  18,100 0.13 0.26 0.00 1.65 
Labor Income to Total Expenditure Ratio 15,369 0.93 1.37 0.00 8.70 
Age of Head of Household 24,003 48.74 17.05 0.00 98.00 
Household size 24,003 2.30 2.35 0.00 28.00 
Number of Kids 5yo and Under 21,084 0.20 0.51 0.00 4.00 
Number of Kids 6yo and Over 21,084 0.57 1.02 0.00 8.00 
Male 21,084 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Married(=1) 23,968 0.33 0.47 0.00 2.00 
Note that the first two variables are the ratios of income streams to total expenses, and hence, if saving occurs, it is possible for each of 
these streams and/or their total to exceed one. 
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Outliers 
Even though there is not a high frequency of outliers in the budget shares, those with a z-
score of over 3 or below -3, are removed from the sample.  This is a less conservative approach 
than we used in our first essay, but the z-scores indicate more outliers in the consumption chapter 
variables. The disadvantage of this approach is an important observation may be deleted from the 
data set. For this reason, in Table 45 (found in the Appendix), we present a summary of the 
number of observations before and after these outliers are dropped.  
Discussion of Variables 
 One reason for using expenses rather than income as a divisor arises from the under-
reporting of income.  It is often the case that the sum of remittances and wages exceed reported 
total income.  Total expenses are often less than the sum of income streams, but greater than 
reported total income.  In other words, reported expenses exceed reported incomes.  Because 
income is often underreported, total expenditures are used as a proxy of total disposable income, 
thus producing the ratios of income streams to expenditures rather than using shares of total 
income.  This practice, although common when working with survey data such as that in this 
paper, has been criticized as being inadequate (Haddad & Bouis, 1991; Subramanian & Deaton, 
1996).  Unfortunately, a preferable solution is not available. The significance of remittances for 
Jamaicans, however, at least offers the opportunity to more adequately control for income 
sources, with remittances and other non-labor income available through the SLC and labor 
income available from the LFS. 
Part of the problem in this particular dataset may arise from inconsistencies in the survey 
or the ability of households to recall all income and expenditures.  The survey instrument often 
requests data spanning different time periods.  For example, respondents are asked how much 
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they spent at the salon in the last 7 days but how much they spent on education over the last 12 
months.  Similarly, respondents can choose to report income as weekly, biweekly, monthly, or 
annually, but are asked to provide remittances received over the last year.  For ease of 
comparison purposes, all figures are converted to their annual equivalents, although we 
recognize that even this process does not create perfect estimates of expenses or incomes. 
It is also important to emphasize that all income and expenditure categories are 
aggregated for members within the same household.  For example, remittances received by 
members of the household are summed.  So, too, are expenses on items such as daily food 
purchases.  Specific categories of expenses are created based on the section heading in the SLC.  
For instance, school spending includes expenses on school supplies, money for school lunch, and 
tuition;  eating out, refers to purchase of meals intended for immediate consumption with the 
main item in this category being restaurant expenses; luxury refers to eating out plus visits to hair 
salon ; home production refers to home production of meals, including growing food as well as 
preparing meals with those food items, while grocery store food refers to purchases of food items 
other than those under the previous two categories, namely grocery store expenses.  Water and 
electric refer  to household spending on water and electricity and home maintenance refers to 
spending on household supplies, ranging from repairing household items to buying kitchen 
equipment. Vices refer to the sum of tobacco, gambling and alcohol expenditure; health is 
expenditure on visits to the doctor or hospital and on medication and donation represents 
amounts given as gifts by the household. The complete list of expenditure types as well as their 
descriptive statistics is given in Table 26 below. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that Jamaica uses a General Consumption Tax that is 
automatically included in the price tag (as opposed to being added in at the register as is done in 
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the United States).  As a result, many, but not all, of the expense categories above include taxes 
paid.  The level of taxes, therefore, could be different based on the service offered, the size of the 
black market in providing services, or simply not applicable, as in the case of home production.  
Because we are estimating marginal effects, this should not affect our results.  Other forms of 
taxes, including income taxes and education taxes, exist, but data in the survey on these taxes is 
not reliable.  
 In the 2002 SLC, respondents were asked two other important questions.  First, they were 
asked what they considered as their primary source of income.  Second, respondents were asked 
how they viewed their financial situation.   
 Table 24 provides a different look at the information from the summary statistics in Table 
23.  Overall, remittances account for an average of 15 percent of income or 13 percent of 
expenses, given that expenses exceed reported total income.  For recipients, remittances 
accounted for an average of 30 percent of household income.  In Table 24, we find that almost 17 
percent of households respond that remittances are their primary means of support. 
Table 24   
Households' Reported Main Means of Support 
Main means of support in 2002 Freq. Percent 
Salaries, wages, earnings of members 5,349 76.68 
Remittance from family/friend abroad 550 7.88 
Support received for children living in the 
household (remittances) 
160 2.29 
Help from family/friend domestically 
(remittances) 
461 6.61 
Welfare support from the Government 154 2.21 
Welfare support from the church/NGO 20 0.29 
Other 269 3.86 
N/A 13 0.19 
Total 6,976 100 
Source: Author’s calculation from Jamaica Survey of living conditions. 
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 When asked about their financial situation, the overwhelming number of households 
indicated they are doing poorly or barely getting by.  While unfortunate, this set of results, 
detailed in Table 25, may provide more reason that using total expenditures as a proxy of total 
income is acceptable, essentially ignoring savings.  Households that are barely getting by are 
unlikely to designate significant shares of their income towards savings.  Although we showed 
an average of six percent savings in the previous table (the excess of wages and remittances to 
expenditures), this number is likely skewed by a handful of outliers, in which case the combined 
ratio is much closer to one for the vast majority of survey respondents. 
 
Table 25 
Self-reported Financial Health of the Household 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although not shown in the tables, thirty percent of respondents receive remittances from 
someone within Jamaica, and 31 percent receive remittances from abroad.  These groups may not 
be mutually exclusive, as it is possible for one household to receive remittances from both 
someone within Jamaica and someone working internationally.  Twenty-one percent of 
households report receiving remittances specifically intended for the care of children, further 
strengthening the hypothesis of a positive relationship between reliance on remittances and 
education expenses.   
Economic status of the household 
in 2002 
Freq. Percent 
Very Poor/unable to manage 1,740 24.94 
Just getting by 3,764 53.96 
Doing okay 1,288 18.46 
Doing well 169 2.42 
No Response 15 0.22 
Total 6,976 100 
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Table 18 provides more detailed descriptive statistics on average expenditures by 
households.  The first part of the table presents the share of household expenditures reported in 
each of these categories.  The second part of the table reports the proportion of households that 
report positive (or non-zero) values for expenses in each one of these areas.   Overall, grocery 
store purchases comprise the largest expenditure category, and ninety-nine percent of households 
report positive expenditures in this category.  Interestingly, vices, including tobacco, alcohol, and 
gambling, comprise only two percent of expenditures, on average, but over one third of 
households report positive expenditures in this area. 
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Table 26  
Descriptive Statistics (Expenditure variables) – All Household Heads 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Expenditure 18,277 3,477.17 2,323.07 0.00 14,001.24 
Budget Shares      
School Share 18,329 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.58 
Vices Share 12,006 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.18 
Luxury Share 18,029 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.58 
Home Production  Share 17,842 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.32 
Grocery Store Purchases Share 18,426 0.51 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Water Share 18,072 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.14 
Electricity Share 18,022 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.30 
Home Maintenance Share 17,732 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.18 
Health Share 14,001 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.24 
Donation Share 12,272 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.10 
Participation ( 0 or 1)      
School Participation 18,329 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Vices Participation 12,006 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Luxury Participation 18,029 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Home Production  Participation 17,842 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Grocery Store Purchases Participation 18,426 0.99 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Water Participation 18,072 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Electricity Participation 18,022 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Home Maintenance Participation 17,732 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Health Participation 14,001 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Donation Participation 12,272 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
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Table 27  
Descriptive Statistics (Expenditure variables) – By Recipient Status 
 Recipients   Non-
recipients 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Total Expenditure 9,159 3,513.63 2,353.50 9,118 3,440.53 2,291.63 
Budget Shares       
School Share 9,174 0.10 0.13 9,155 0.08 0.12 
Vices Share 5,570 0.02 0.04 6,436 0.02 0.04 
Luxury Share 9,054 0.14 0.13 8,975 0.14 0.14 
Home Production  Share 8,864 0.06 0.07 8,978 0.05 0.07 
Grocery Store Purchases Share 9,226 0.50 0.19 9,200 0.51 0.19 
Water Share 9,074 0.02 0.03 8,998 0.02 0.03 
Electricity Share 9,037 0.07 0.06 8,985 0.08 0.07 
Home Maintenance Share 8,958 0.01 0.03 8,774 0.01 0.03 
Health Share 6,953 0.02 0.04 7,048 0.01 0.04 
Donation Share 5,668 0.01 0.02 6,604 0.01 0.02 
Participation ( 0 or 1)       
School Participation 9,174 0.50 0.50 9,155 0.40 0.49 
Vices Participation 5,570 0.35 0.48 6,436 0.36 0.48 
Luxury Participation 9,054 0.78 0.42 8,975 0.76 0.43 
Home Production  Participation 8,864 0.73 0.44 8,978 0.59 0.49 
Grocery Store Purchases Part. 9,226 0.99 0.10 9,200 0.99 0.10 
Water Participation 9,074 0.45 0.50 8,998 0.50 0.50 
Electricity Participation 9,037 0.76 0.43 8,985 0.78 0.42 
Home Maintenance Part. 8,958 0.19 0.39 8,774 0.20 0.40 
Health Participation 6,953 0.25 0.43 7,048 0.17 0.37 
Donation Participation 5,668 0.46 0.50 6,604 0.31 0.46 
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Rather than focusing on the data in Table 26, however, we turn our attention to the data 
in Table 27, where the first relevant distinction is made between remittance recipients and other 
households.  For example, the summary statistics suggest that households receiving remittances 
allocate slightly more money to school, education, and home production, while decreasing the 
shares of expenditures allocated to grocery store purchases and electricity.  While summary 
statistics help to tell the story, they are insufficient in explaining everything.  For example, 
families without children are unlikely to report education expenses.  At the same time, almost 
one third of households report receiving remittances for children.  It is not surprising, therefore, 
that fifty percent of households receiving remittances report spending money on school, while 
only forty percent of households not receiving remittances report positive values for school 
expenses.  The participation data also reveal that households receiving remittances are 
significantly more likely to report positive values of home production, donations, and health 
expenses prior to the survey. 
Thinking about the mean expenditure shares and participation in an expense category 
jointly also adds an additional level of insight.  For example, consider the expense category of 
donations.  In terms of average levels donated, both recipients and non-recipients donate and 
average of one percent of their income.  However, recipients of remittances are much more likely 
to report positive donations.  With fewer donors proportionately, this suggests that the donations 
made by non-recipients who do donate must be larger as a share of expenses than the donations 
made by households receiving remittances.  This differs from an expense category like vices, 
where average expenditures and participation rates are almost identical. 
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In order to better determine the extent that reliance on remittances affects household 
consumption behavior, the next section of this paper presents results from several empirical 
techniques. 
Results 
We begin with the most basic of models and progress to more advanced models in an 
attempt to provide consistent parameter estimates.  These models include a basic OLS model, a 
fractional response model, and a fractional response model instrumenting for remittances.  
Whenever appropriate, marginal effects are also computed. 
OLS Regression on all Household Heads 
The first set of results is presented in Table 28. The results show Engel curve estimations 
(OLS) of the various budget shares. The variable of primary interest is the ratio of remittances to 
total expenditures.  For this term to be significant, it means that even after controlling for total 
expenditures, a proxy for total income, the reliance on remittances relative to other forms of 
income has a separate effect on the budget share.  
Although the expected effects are not large, this model suggests that for many 
expenditure categories, increases in reliance on remittances affect consumption behavior.  For 
example, a 10 percent increase in the remittance ratio increases the budget share on schooling by 
almost 0.2 percentage points.  Similar, positive relationships are also found between reliance on 
remittances and expenditures on home production of food, health expenditures, and donations.  
In the case of home production, it could be the case that increased reliance on remittances 
replaces earned income, and therefore the household has more time to spend working in personal 
gardens and farms.  For other expense categories, it may be more likely that remittances are sent 
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for specific causes (such as an illness) or with particular intentions such as sharing (as with 
donations). 
Interestingly, while home production increased with remittances, this did not come at the 
expense of eating out (part of luxury), but instead seems to decrease grocery store purchases.  In 
other words, people are cooking with home-grown food rather than purchasing produce but still 
enjoying the occasional meal away from home.  It is also possible that households where 
individuals rely on remittances understate to their community the level of outside support 
received, and receive more gifts-in-kind in the form of food items from neighbors, thus reducing 
grocery expenditures.   
When the share of some expense categories increases, it is necessarily the case that others 
decrease.  In this case, increased reliance on remittances for expenditures decreases the budget 
shares for water, electricity, vices, and grocery store purchases, as already mentioned.  It might 
be the case that these items are normal goods, and an increase in income increases consumption, 
but the change in consumption is less than the change in income, making these items income 
inelastic. 
For luxury spending and home maintenance, households appear to spend the same 
percentage of their budgets on these items, regardless of the source of income. 
Other variables are worth noting at this time.  First, increases in total expenditure (hence 
total income) increase almost all expenditure categories except home production and grocery 
store purchases, implying these options are inferior to eating out (luxury spending).  Increases in 
income also have no statistically significant effect on vices, implying vices such as tobacco, 
alcohol, or gambling are income inelastic. 
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We also find that household size positively affects schooling and health care 
expenditures, ceteris paribus, but interestingly, are associated with decreased shares of water, 
electricity, and household maintenance.  Instead, these households spend more on home 
production and food, reinforcing the idea that most families in Jamaica are barely getting by, as 
suggested in the Data section. 
As the number of children over age five increases, school expenditures increase 
significantly (5.8 percent for each child), which grocery story spending declines.  This likely 
reflects the purchase of school lunches, included in school spending.  Families with younger 
children, however, spend more on groceries and health, ceteris paribus.  Households headed by 
males spend notably less than female headed households on education and purchases from 
grocery stores while spending significantly more on luxuries (including eating out), vices, and 
home maintenance.  Finally, married heads of household spend significantly more on groceries 
and less on luxuries, ceteris paribus. 
Although these results are interesting, we find that similar patterns emerge in many 
specifications.  For this reason, the remainder of this section focuses on the effect of the 
remittance ratio rather than the effects of additional control variables.
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Table 28  
OLS Regression of Budget Shares–Basic Engle Curve 
Dependent 
Variable 
School Vices    Luxury   Home 
Produc-
tion  
Grocery 
Store 
Purchas-
es  
Water Electrici-
ty      
Home 
Mainten-
ance         
Health Donation         
Log of Total 
Expenditure 
0.032*** 0.001 0.057*** -0.029*** -0.081*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Remittances 
Ratio  
0.018*** -
0.007*** 
-0.001 0.014*** -0.019*** -
0.005*** 
-0.008*** 0.000 0.003* 0.002*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age of 
Head of 
Household 
0.000** -
0.000*** 
-
0.002*** 
0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household 
size 
0.014*** -
0.001*** 
-0.001 0.002*** 0.002** -
0.002*** 
-0.003*** -0.003*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of 
Kids 5yo 
and Under 
-
0.009*** 
-
0.003*** 
-
0.023*** 
0.003*** 0.039*** -
0.002*** 
-0.007*** 0.001** 0.002** -0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Number of 
Kids 6yo 
and Over 
0.058*** -
0.002*** 
-
0.012*** 
0.003*** -0.027*** -
0.003*** 
-0.009*** -0.002*** -
0.002*** 
-0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -
0.024*** 
0.014*** 0.019*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -
0.004*** 
-0.012*** 0.004*** -
0.004*** 
-0.002*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Married(=1) -
0.007*** 
-
0.005*** 
-
0.015*** 
-0.001 0.029*** 0.003*** 0.016*** -0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
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_cons -
0.193*** 
0.021*** -
0.192*** 
0.226*** 1.230*** -
0.017*** 
-0.012 -0.070*** -
0.058*** 
-0.014*** 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.015) (0.008) (0.020) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) 
Year and 
Parish 
Controls 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.43 0.06 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 
N 15,045 9,236 14,797 14,688 15,118 14,826 14,812 14,577 11,454 9,449 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses
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Although many of the OLS results follow our expectations, the OLS results are tentative 
given that remittance share may be endogenous and the dependent variables are proportions.  
The next set of results accounts for the large number of zeros in most of the budget shares as 
well as the fractional nature of the dependent variable.  
Two-part Model Assuming Exogeneity of RHS 
As explained in the methodology section, the two-part fractional response model is 
appropriate in this application. The results in Table (29) represent the probability that any 
expenditure takes place for each of the different expenditure types, part one of the two part 
model.  Increases in total expenses, a proxy for total income, increase the probability of positive 
expenses in all categories except home production of food, suggesting that as income rises, 
people prefer to purchase food from stores or eat out, an expected finding.  More interesting, 
however, is the significance on reliance on remittances relative to other income.  Remittances are 
associated with increased probability of reporting positive expenses on schooling, home 
production of food, home maintenance, health care, and donations, ceteris paribus.  Again, it 
could be the case that households with children are more likely to receive remittances, but the 
regression controls for children in the household.  The household may also report positive values 
for food production because the receipt of remittances allows the household member to stay 
home and farm.  Finally, remittances may be sent for specific home repairs or purchases of 
durable goods, so again, we see the expected, positive relationship. 
Interestingly, households reporting receipt of remittances were less likely to report 
positive expenses for vices and water, an interesting combination.  It may be the case that family 
members abroad do not send money to family members who they fear will misuse the money.
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Table 29   
Logit Regression-Likelihood of Spending (0 to 1) – First Part 
Dependent 
Variable 
School Vices    Luxury   Home 
Produc-
tion  
Grocery 
Store 
Purchases  
Water Electricity      Home 
Mainten-
ance         
Health Donation         
Log of 
Total 
Expenditur
e 
1.342*** 0.468*** 1.599*** -0.198*** 1.044*** 1.282*** 1.678*** 1.138*** 0.554*** 0.723*** 
 (0.050) (0.039) (0.043) (0.032) (0.112) (0.035) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) 
Remittanc
es Ratio  
0.491*** -0.336*** 0.066 0.657*** -0.096 -0.246*** -0.129 0.223** 0.301*** 0.652*** 
 (0.106) (0.091) (0.092) (0.089) (0.318) (0.079) (0.089) (0.097) (0.096) (0.087) 
Age of 
Head of 
Household 
0.007*** -0.014*** -0.035*** 0.009*** 0.007 0.003** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household 
size 
0.805*** -0.023 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.067 -0.188*** -0.134*** -0.235*** 0.086*** -0.013 
 (0.026) (0.016) (0.019) (0.013) (0.099) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Number of 
Kids 5yo 
and Under 
-0.011 -0.151*** -0.190*** 0.090** 0.477 -0.147*** -0.229*** 0.026 0.227*** -0.146*** 
 (0.058) (0.049) (0.053) (0.041) (0.363) (0.040) (0.045) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) 
Number of 
Kids 6yo 
and Over 
2.513*** -0.094*** -0.122*** 0.086*** 0.069 -0.247*** -0.248*** -0.207*** -0.066** -0.048* 
 (0.063) (0.025) (0.029) (0.021) (0.168) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
Male -
0.786*** 
0.740*** 0.008 0.138*** -0.604*** -0.267*** -0.341*** 0.129*** -0.407*** -0.506*** 
 (0.058) (0.051) (0.051) (0.041) (0.213) (0.040) (0.050) (0.049) (0.054) (0.051) 
Married(= -0.037 -0.195*** -0.189*** 0.093** 1.085*** 0.148*** 0.485*** -0.147*** 0.295*** 0.565*** 
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1) 
 (0.061) (0.053) (0.056) (0.044) (0.313) (0.043) (0.055) (0.053) (0.057) (0.054) 
_cons -
11.988**
* 
-3.922*** -9.474*** 0.405 -3.949*** -9.883*** -13.021*** -9.881*** -7.190*** -7.997*** 
 (0.435) (0.328) (0.349) (0.266) (0.987) (0.303) (0.360) (0.359) (0.383) (0.360) 
Year and 
Parish 
Controls 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 15,045 9,236 14,797 14,688 14,587 14,826 14,812 14,577 11,454 9,449 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
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Table 30  
Fractional Response Model – Second Part 
Dependent 
Variable 
School Vices    Luxury   Home 
Production  
Grocery 
Store 
Purchases 
Share 
Water Electricity      Home 
Maintenan
ce         
Health Donation         
Log of 
Total 
Expenditur
e 
-0.035** -0.311*** 0.167*** -0.521*** -0.379*** -0.427*** -0.330*** 0.588*** -0.042 -0.158*** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.045) (0.030) (0.030) 
Remittance
s Share  
0.122*** -0.174*** -0.046 0.066* -0.084*** -0.109*** -0.091*** -0.074 -0.024 -0.116** 
 (0.035) (0.060) (0.035) (0.036) (0.024) (0.032) (0.026) (0.120) (0.073) (0.057) 
Age of 
Head of 
Household 
0.003*** 0.000 -0.011*** 0.004*** -0.000 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household 
size 
0.012** -0.041*** -0.016*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.013** -0.007* -0.244*** -0.026** -0.064*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.022) (0.011) (0.012) 
Number of 
Kids 5yo 
and Under 
-0.089*** -0.068** -0.161*** 0.037* 0.153*** -0.051*** -0.078*** 0.081 -0.054 -0.041 
 (0.015) (0.033) (0.015) (0.020) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.068) (0.037) (0.042) 
Number of 
Kids 6yo 
and Over 
0.187*** -0.060*** -0.080*** 0.021** -0.109*** -0.042*** -0.077*** -0.162*** -0.070*** -0.077*** 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.036) (0.020) (0.019) 
Male -0.031 0.184*** 0.150*** 0.176*** -0.073*** -0.047*** -0.073*** 0.413*** 0.031 0.039 
 (0.019) (0.033) (0.016) (0.021) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.057) (0.039) (0.038) 
Married(=
1) 
-0.139*** -0.016 -0.089*** -0.028 0.102*** 0.073*** 0.124*** -0.239*** -0.035 0.121*** 
 (0.019) (0.033) (0.017) (0.022) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.060) (0.041) (0.038) 
_cons -1.362*** -0.233 -2.281*** 0.958*** 3.199*** 0.190 0.214** -8.187*** -2.661*** -2.617*** 
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 (0.156) (0.203) (0.131) (0.143) (0.093) (0.117) (0.091) (0.380) (0.281) (0.268) 
Year and 
Parish 
Controls 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 7,003 3,392 11,576 9,702 14,988 7,009 11,480 2,771 2,388 3,608 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
 
  
118 
 
 
The second part of this analysis evaluates the effect reliance on remittances has on budget 
shares conditional on positive spending in the given stream.  The results for this analysis are 
much more interesting.  Considering that estimations are only for those households reporting 
positive expenditures, increased reliance on remittances is associated with greater spending on 
school and home production but lower budget shares for vices, grocery store purchases, water, 
electricity, and donations.   
The nature of the dependent variables in the above tables limits our ability to directly 
interpret coefficients, and thus, the tables that follow present marginal effects from the above 
regressions.  Based on Table 31, we find that a one unit increase in the remittance ratio ( a 
relatively large change equivalent to going from no remittances to all remittances) increases the 
expected probability of reporting positive school expenses by 0.11, ceteris paribus, while the 
probability of reporting positive home production values increases by 0.14 and the probability of 
reporting a donation was made increases by almost 0.15.  The largest decrease in probability due 
to an increase in remittance reliance occurs for vices, with a 0.07 decline in the probability of 
reporting positive spending.  
The marginal effects for the conditional component in part two of the process are located 
immediately below in Table (32) and although some are statistically significant (as described 
above), the magnitudes suggest less importance.  Instead, we turn to the results in the third table, 
the total effects, calculated using Equation (41).  This effect takes into account both the 
probability of spending, average spending, and spending conditional on receiving remittances.   
Two expenses categories stand out, schooling and grocery store purchases, although there 
are small effects in other categories.  Increases in remittances are expected to increase the share 
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of expenses allocated to budget by two percent, while decreases grocery store expenses by 
roughly the same amount.
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Table 31  
Partial Effects-Probability of Participation assuming Exogeneity 
Dependent Variable School Vices    Luxury   Home 
Produc
tion  
Grocer
y Store 
Purcha
ses 
Share 
Water Electri
city      
Home 
Mainte
nance         
Health Donati
on         
Predicted probability 0.5966 0.3561 0.8426 0.6801 0.9965 0.4619 0.8258 0.1672 0.1869 0.3613 
Log of Total Expenditure 0.3205 0.1078 0.2125 -0.0449 0.0037 0.3198 0.2421 0.1580 0.0829 0.1672 
Remittances Ratio 0.1141 -0.0750 0.0086 0.1425 -0.0003 -0.0601 -0.0187 0.0308 0.0455 0.1490 
Age of Head of Household 0.0018 -0.0032 -0.0046 0.0019 0.0000 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0038 0.0048 
Household size 0.1941 -0.0049 0.0112 0.0186 0.0002 -0.0469 -0.0191 -0.0326 0.0131 -0.0030 
Number of Kids 5yo and 
Under 
0.0003 -0.0351 -0.0249 0.0195 0.0017 -0.0371 -0.0328 0.0037 0.0354 -0.0311 
Number of Kids 6yo and 
Over 
0.6189 -0.0216 -0.0166 0.0184 0.0002 -0.0608 -0.0358 -0.0284 -0.0096 -0.0105 
Male -0.1899 0.1695 0.0017 0.0302 -0.0021 -0.0657 -0.0484 0.0181 -0.0637 -0.1196 
Married(=1) -0.0100 -0.0459 -0.0249 0.0210 0.0038 0.0365 0.0686 -0.0209 0.0463 0.1285 
Year and Parish Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 32  
Partial Effects- Conditional Mean given Participation assuming Exogeneity 
Dependent Variable School Vices    Luxury   Home 
Produc
tion  
Grocer
y Store 
Purcha
ses 
Share 
Water Electri
city      
Home 
Mainte
nance         
Health Donati
on         
Predicted Conditional mean 0.2043 0.0534 0.1873 0.0748 0.5076 0.0434 0.0963 0.0351 0.0756 0.0188 
Log of Total Expenditure -0.0057 -0.0157 0.0257 -0.0362 -0.0945 -0.0178 -0.0288 0.0200 -0.0033 -0.0028 
Remittances Share  0.0002 -0.0088 -0.0070 0.0045 -0.0203 -0.0045 -0.0076 -0.0025 -0.0017 -0.0022 
Age of Head of Household 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0017 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 
Household size 0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0023 0.0013 0.0032 0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0084 -0.0018 -0.0012 
Number of Kids 5yo and 
Under 
-0.0139 -0.0033 -0.0245 0.0025 0.0378 -0.0021 -0.0067 0.0027 -0.0036 -0.0007 
Number of Kids 6yo and 
Over 
0.0307 -0.0031 -0.0124 0.0015 -0.0274 -0.0017 -0.0066 -0.0055 -0.0048 -0.0014 
Male -0.0051 0.0092 0.0232 0.0120 -0.0180 -0.0019 -0.0064 0.0136 0.0020 0.0007 
Married(=1) -0.0225 -0.0008 -0.0136 -0.0019 0.0255 0.0030 0.0109 -0.0082 -0.0020 0.0022 
Year and Parish Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 33  
Total Partial Effect assuming Exogeneity 
Dependent Variable School Vices    Luxury   Home 
Produc
tion  
Grocer
y Store 
Purcha
ses  
Water Electri
city      
Home 
Mainte
nance         
Health Donati
on         
Log of Total Expenditure 0.0621 0.0002 0.0614 -0.0280 -0.0923 0.0057 -0.0004 0.0089 0.0057 0.0021 
Remittances Share  0.0234 -0.0072 -0.0043 0.0137 -0.0204 -0.0047 -0.0081 0.0007 0.0031 0.0020 
Age of Head of Household 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0023 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 
Household size 0.0407 -0.0010 0.0001 0.0023 0.0033 -0.0018 -0.0024 -0.0025 0.0007 -0.0005 
Number of Kids 5yo and 
Under 
-0.0082 -0.0031 -0.0253 0.0032 0.0385 -0.0026 -0.0087 0.0006 0.0020 -0.0008 
Number of Kids 6yo and 
Over 
0.1447 -0.0023 -0.0136 0.0024 -0.0272 -0.0034 -0.0089 -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0007 
Male -0.0419 0.0123 0.0199 0.0104 -0.0190 -0.0037 -0.0100 0.0029 -0.0044 -0.0020 
Married(=1) -0.0155 -0.0027 -0.0161 0.0002 0.0273 0.0030 0.0156 -0.0021 0.0031 0.0032 
Year and Parish Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
123 
 
 
Two-part Model with Endogenous Remittances 
  
 As discussed earlier in the paper, there are valid reasons to question the assumption that 
remittances are exogenous.  Specifically, is it the case that households receive remittances and 
then decide how to spend this income, or is it the case that expenses arise – such as home repair 
or health needs – and someone outside of the household sends money for these purposes.  For 
this reason, this section introduces an instrument for remittances.  Remittances are summed at the 
district level, and this value is then used as an instrument for reliance on remittances at the 
household level. Table 34 contains the results of the OLS first stage regression of the 
endogenous variable (remittances ratio) on the exogenous variables and this instrument, district 
level remittances. Recall that only the remittance ratio is assumed endogenous in the 
consumption chapter, but there are different columns for each equation because of missing 
observations for some budget shares. 
 The following set of tables present results from the two part estimation with the ratio of 
remittances instrumented by district-level remittances.  In Table 35, we find that reliance on 
remittances positively affects the probability a household spends on vices, luxury, home 
production, electricity, and donations. Interestingly, this is the first instance in which the 
probability of spending on schooling does not increase.  Looking at the marginal effect in Table 
39, however, we see that the expected effect of reliance on remittances on school spending is 
larger than all but two of the other effects, although this variable lacks statistical significance. 
 In the second step, we find that conditional on reporting positive levels of spending, 
increased reliance on remittances is associated with increased shares of luxury items and home 
production and decreased shares of grocery store purchases and electricity.  Interestingly, when 
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instrumenting, reliance on remittances increases the probability of spending on electricity, but 
conditional on spending, decreases the share of electricity relative to total expenses.  Other 
categories, including spending and health, do not vary with reliance on remittances once we 
instrument. 
 Below the two-part model with the endogenous remittance ratio are three additional 
tables presenting the marginal effects. 
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Table 34   
First-Stage Regression of Remittance Share on the Exogenous variables 
Endogenous variable is remittance as a ratio of total expenditure 
Equation: School Vices    Luxury   Home 
Production  
Grocery 
Store 
Purchases 
Share 
Water Electricity      Home 
Maintenan
ce         
Health Donation         
Log of 
Total 
Expenditur
e  
-0.046*** -0.054*** -0.047*** -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.055*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age of 
Head of 
Household 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household 
size 
0.003** 0.004** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.001 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of 
Kids 5yo 
and Under 
0.016*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Number of 
Kids 6yo 
and Over 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Male -0.058*** -0.079*** -0.058*** -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.058*** -0.068*** -0.083*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Married(=1
) 
-0.031*** -0.044*** -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.041*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
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District 
Level 
Remittance
s (in 1000s) 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
_cons 0.460*** 0.483*** 0.492*** 0.417*** 0.451*** 0.454*** 0.462*** 0.443*** 0.488*** 0.484*** 
 (0.028) (0.038) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.037) 
athrho -0.060 -0.212*** -0.367*** -0.410*** -0.199 -0.021 -0.139* 0.000 -0.074 -0.098 
Year and 
Parish 
Controls 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 (0.081) (0.067) (0.075) (0.064) (0.217) (0.060) (0.073) (0.071) (0.083) (0.069) 
lnsigma 
_cons 
-1.466*** -1.347*** -1.463*** -1.484*** -1.465*** -1.468*** -1.467*** -1.468*** -1.430*** -1.356*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
 15,045 9,236 14,797 14,688 14,587 14,826 14,812 14,577 11,454 9,449 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
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Table 35 
IV Probit–First-part of the Two-part Model 
Dependent 
Variable 
School Vices    Luxury   Home 
Productio
n  
Grocery 
Store 
Purchases 
Share 
Water Electricity      Home 
Maintena
nce         
Health Donation         
Log of 
Total 
Expenditur
e 
0.786*** 0.318*** 0.916*** -0.044** 0.459*** 0.776*** 0.973*** 0.626*** 0.331*** 0.451*** 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.052) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
Remittanc
es Ratio  
0.521 0.572** 1.510*** 2.013*** 0.765 -0.062 0.511* 0.126 0.476 0.756*** 
 (0.342) (0.246) (0.280) (0.229) (0.899) (0.257) (0.308) (0.303) (0.339) (0.259) 
Age of 
Head of 
Household 
0.003*** -0.009*** -0.020*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household 
size 
0.417*** -0.017* 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.007 -0.113*** -0.077*** -0.126*** 0.052*** -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.034) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Number of 
Kids 5yo 
and Under 
0.001 -0.106*** -0.123*** 0.026 0.151 -0.090*** -0.134*** 0.012 0.123*** -0.096*** 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.122) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) 
Number of 
Kids 6yo 
and Over 
1.264*** -0.056*** -0.060*** 0.052*** 0.015 -0.149*** -0.137*** -0.116*** -0.040*** -0.030* 
 (0.030) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.058) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Male -
0.439*** 
0.499*** 0.090*** 0.173*** -0.205** -0.157*** -0.153*** 0.073** -0.212*** -0.274*** 
 (0.039) (0.033) (0.032) (0.026) (0.103) (0.029) (0.034) (0.033) (0.040) (0.039) 
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Married(=
1) 
0.012 -0.074** -0.041 0.108*** 0.432*** 0.092*** 0.291*** -0.084*** 0.175*** 0.356*** 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.026) (0.109) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) 
_cons -
6.972*** 
-2.729*** -5.721*** -0.495*** -1.525*** -5.989*** -7.618*** -5.513*** -4.285*** -4.970*** 
 (0.268) (0.214) (0.185) (0.187) (0.554) (0.207) (0.208) (0.238) (0.256) (0.230) 
 15,045 9,236 14,797 14,688 14,587 14,826 14,812 14,577 11,454 9,449 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
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Table 36  
Fractional Response Model – With Endogenous Remittances 
Dependent 
Variable 
School Vices    Luxury   Home 
Productio
n  
Grocery 
Store 
Purchases  
Water Electricity      Home 
Maintena
nce         
Health Donation         
    18 0.206 0.065 -
0.933*** 
-0.279 0.527*** 0.051 0.548*** 0.796 -0.410 0.196 
 (0.183) (0.328) (0.160) (0.192) (0.120) (0.171) (0.139) (0.657) (0.408) (0.418) 
Log of 
Total 
Expenditur
e 
-
0.044** 
-
0.313**
* 
0.206*** -
0.509*** 
-0.401*** -0.430*** -0.353*** 0.553*** -0.025 -0.166*** 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.053) (0.034) (0.035) 
Remittanc
es Ratio  
-0.075 -0.236 0.849*** 0.336* -0.594*** -0.158 -0.620*** -0.845 0.376 -0.307 
 (0.178) (0.320) (0.156) (0.189) (0.117) (0.170) (0.137) (0.650) (0.402) (0.411) 
Age of 
Head of 
Household 
0.003**
* 
0.000 -
0.012*** 
0.003*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household 
size 
0.012** -
0.040**
* 
-
0.018*** 
0.017*** 0.014*** 0.013** -0.006 -0.241*** -0.027** -0.063*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.022) (0.011) (0.012) 
Number of 
Kids 5yo 
and Under 
-
0.086**
* 
-0.067** -
0.176*** 
0.033 0.161*** -0.051*** -0.069*** 0.092 -0.060 -0.038 
 (0.015) (0.033) (0.016) (0.020) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.069) (0.038) (0.042) 
Number of 
Kids 6yo 
0.187**
* 
-
0.060**
-
0.079*** 
0.022** -0.110*** -0.042*** -0.077*** -0.162*** -0.070*** -0.077*** 
                                                          
18
 Vhat is the residual from the regression of the endogenous variable on all the exogenous variables including the instrumental variable. 
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and Over * 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.036) (0.020) (0.019) 
Male -0.042* 0.180**
* 
0.205*** 0.192*** -0.104*** -0.050*** -0.105*** 0.368*** 0.055 0.027 
 (0.022) (0.037) (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.068) (0.046) (0.045) 
Married(=
1) 
-
0.145**
* 
-0.018 -
0.061*** 
-0.020 0.086*** 0.071*** 0.107*** -0.262*** -0.023 0.115*** 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.018) (0.023) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.063) (0.042) (0.040) 
_cons -
1.273**
* 
-0.204 -
2.702*** 
0.835*** 3.432*** 0.214 0.457*** -7.823*** -2.840*** -2.534*** 
 (0.173) (0.245) (0.150) (0.166) (0.108) (0.145) (0.109) (0.483) (0.329) (0.324) 
Year and 
Parish 
Controls 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 7,003 3,392 11,576 9,702 14,988 7,009 11,480 2,771 2,388 3,608 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses), vhat is the residuals from the first stage regression. 
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Table 37  
Partial Effects: Probability of Participation with Endogenous Remittances 
Dependent Variable School Vices    Luxury   Home 
Produc
tion  
Grocer
y Store 
Purcha
ses  
Water Electri
city      
Home 
Mainte
nance         
Health Donati
on         
Predicted probability 0.5452 0.3616 0.8189 0.6637 0.9959 0.4628 0.8156 0.1715 0.1909 0.3650 
Log of Total Expenditure 0.3117 0.1191 0.2413 -0.0162 0.0056 0.3082 0.2592 0.1593 0.0901 0.1694 
Remittances Share  0.2063 0.2144 0.3978 0.7345 0.0093 -0.0246 0.1361 0.0321 0.1296 0.2843 
Age of Head of Household 0.0012 -0.0035 -0.0053 0.0013 0.0000 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0038 0.0045 
Household size 0.1654 -0.0063 0.0090 0.0146 0.0001 -0.0448 -0.0205 -0.0322 0.0142 -0.0033 
Number of Kids 5yo and 
Under 
0.0003 -0.0397 -0.0325 0.0094 0.0018 -0.0356 -0.0357 0.0030 0.0334 -0.0360 
Number of Kids 6yo and 
Over 
0.5009 -0.0209 -0.0158 0.0189 0.0002 -0.0592 -0.0365 -0.0295 -0.0109 -0.0112 
Male -0.1720 0.1832 0.0237 0.0635 -0.0024 -0.0623 -0.0404 0.0185 -0.0581 -0.1035 
Married(=1) 0.0046 -0.0276 -0.0108 0.0395 0.0053 0.0366 0.0775 -0.0214 0.0475 0.1339 
Year and Parish Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 38  
Partial Effects: Conditional Mean given Participation with Endogenous Remittances 
 School Vices    Luxury   Home 
Produc
tion  
Grocer
y Store 
Purcha
ses  
Water Electri
city      
Home 
Mainte
nance         
Health Donati
on         
Predicted Conditional mean 0.2044 0.0534 0.1870 0.0749 0.5079 0.0434 0.0963 0.0351 0.0755 0.0188 
Log of Total Expenditure -0.0071 -0.0158 0.0314 -0.0353 -0.1002 -0.0179 -0.0307 0.0187 -0.0018 -0.0031 
Remittances Share  -0.0122 -0.0119 0.1291 0.0233 -0.1483 -0.0066 -0.0539 -0.0286 0.0263 -0.0056 
Age of Head of Household 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0019 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 
Household size 0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0028 0.0012 0.0036 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0082 -0.0019 -0.0012 
Number of Kids 5yo and 
Under 
-0.0139 -0.0034 -0.0267 0.0023 0.0403 -0.0021 -0.0060 0.0031 -0.0042 -0.0007 
Number of Kids 6yo and 
Over 
0.0304 -0.0031 -0.0120 0.0015 -0.0274 -0.0017 -0.0067 -0.0055 -0.0049 -0.0014 
Male -0.0069 0.0089 0.0309 0.0131 -0.0259 -0.0021 -0.0092 0.0122 0.0039 0.0005 
Married(=1) -0.0236 -0.0009 -0.0093 -0.0014 0.0215 0.0030 0.0093 -0.0089 -0.0016 0.0021 
Year and Parish Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
133 
 
 
 
Table 39  
Total Partial Effect with Endogenous Remittances 
 School Vices    Luxury   Home 
Produc
tion  
Grocer
y Store 
Purcha
ses 
Water Electri
city      
Home 
Mainte
nance         
Health Donati
on         
Log of Total Expenditure 0.0598 0.0006 0.0708 -0.0246 -0.0970 0.0051 -0.0001 0.0088 0.0065 0.0021 
Remittances Share  0.0355 0.0071 0.1802 0.0704 -0.1430 -0.0041 -0.0309 -0.0038 0.0148 0.0033 
Age of Head of Household 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0025 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 
Household size 0.0349 -0.0011 -0.0006 0.0019 0.0036 -0.0017 -0.0024 -0.0025 0.0007 -0.0005 
Number of Kids 5yo and 
Under 
-0.0075 -0.0033 -0.0279 0.0022 0.0411 -0.0025 -0.0084 0.0006 0.0017 -0.0009 
Number of Kids 6yo and 
Over 
0.1189 -0.0022 -0.0128 0.0024 -0.0272 -0.0034 -0.0090 -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0007 
Male -0.0389 0.0130 0.0298 0.0135 -0.0270 -0.0037 -0.0114 0.0027 -0.0037 -0.0018 
Married(=1) -0.0119 -0.0018 -0.0096 0.0021 0.0240 0.0030 0.0151 -0.0023 0.0033 0.0033 
Year and Parish Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Bolded coefficients represent those variables that are significant in the first and/or the second part of the fractional response model 
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The calculated values for the total partial effects in Table (37) show which of the two 
components of the condition mean in Equation (41) exerts the stronger influence. For luxury, 
home production, and health, both components are positive, meaning reliance on remittances not 
only increases the likelihood of spending on these items, but it also increases the amount spent. 
A one percentage point increase in the remittance to expenses ratio leads to a 0.18 percentage 
point increase in luxury goods’ budget share, a 0.07 percentage point increase in home 
production budget share, and a 0.01 percentage point increase in the share of health spending in 
the budget.  
Only for water do we see remittance reliance negatively impacting the likelihood of 
purchase and spending simultaneously. One possible explanation is metered versus non-metered 
water sources. Metered water access in Jamaica is restricted to major urban areas, with a 
significant amount of rural residents relying on large tanks which they may pay to have filled 
only once or twice for the year.  These tanks are able to collect rainwater, reducing the amount 
households pay for water during rainy seasons. Even though parish is controlled for in all the 
regressions, it is still possible that poorer residents in any parish, who are themselves more likely 
to be heavily reliant on remittances, would be more likely to have these tanks. 
Of the remaining budget shares-school, vices, donation, grocery, electric and home 
maintenance – only grocery purchases and electricity are negative and statistically significant in 
the second part of the response model and either positive or insignificant in the first step.  The 
negative effect when estimating the conditional mean has the more dominant role in estimating 
the total effect, and therefore, we find that increased reliance on remittances significantly 
decreases the total share of expenditures comprised of electricity and grocery store purchases.   
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Finally, the budget shares for school, vices and donation are negative but not statistically 
different from zero in part two of the model, estimating the conditional mean.  The most 
surprising of these is the coefficient on school, which was consistently positive in previous 
models.  Although positive in the participation estimation in step one, it still lacks significance.  
This finding suggests that while controlling for the number of children in the household and 
potential endogeneity of remittances, that increased reliance on remittances may not affect 
school spending as the previous results suggested.    
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Three empirical strategies are presented above, an OLS model, a fractional response 
model assuming exogeneity of remittances, and a two-part fractional response model 
instrumenting for the ratio of remittances to expenses.  Table 38 summarizes the signs of 
significant coefficients in each of these approaches. 
 A couple categories stand out as being remarkable consistent across the models.  First, 
home production – regardless of whether we are talking about participation or budget share, and 
whether we treat the remittance ratio as exogenous or endogenous – increases with an increased 
reliance on remittances.  It is possible that remittances are picking up an observed factor such as 
how far the household is from an area with economic opportunity.  The regressions each control 
for parish fixed effects, but even like counties in the United States, various towns within an area 
may be further away from areas with concentrated employment opportunities.  It is also possible, 
as the theory from the previous essay suggest, that recipients of remittances opt to work fewer 
hours in the formal labor market, and instead, these households are spending more time 
cultivating crops for personal use.  Again, we would find a positive relationship between reliance 
on remittances and household production. 
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 As recipients of remittances devote more energy to home production, this increase comes 
at the expense of grocery story purchases, as opposed to a luxury such as eating away from 
home.  The results consistently show that increased reliance on remittances decreases the share 
of expenses on grocery store items.   
 Expenses on schooling are positively affected by reliance on remittances, controlling for 
the number of children in the household.  Although not as consistent as household production, in 
all three models, we find that the total effect of reliance on remittance positively affects spending 
on education.  The magnitude of this effect is also relatively large across all models.  This may 
result from the expectations of the senders rather than differences in preferences by the recipient 
household.  Unfortunately, the current data does not allow us to make that distinction.   
 Other variables are less consistent across models.  As already mentioned, electricity is 
generally negatively affected by reliance on remittances, but in one participation equation, we 
find that reliance on remittances increases the likelihood of reporting an electrical expense.   
 Luxury spending is another interesting category.  It is not significant in either of the first 
two models, but is highly significant when we treat remittances as endogenous.  Whether or not 
it is the intention of the sender, it appears that the receipt of un-earned income such as 
remittances positively affects a household’s willingness to spend on luxuries such as eating out 
and visiting a salon, ceteris paribus.   
 In the earlier models, the share of spending on vices such as tobacco and alcohol were 
negatively related to reliance on remittances.  When we consider the total effect of reliance on 
remittances in the two part model in which remittances is exogenous, we find the magnitude of 
this effect to be extremely small.  In the two-part model in which remittances is endogenous, we 
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actually find that the probability of spending money on any included vice increases with reliance 
on remittances, a surprising finding. 
 The last category we will discuss is health.  Surprisingly, the results on whether reliance 
on remittances affects health expenditures were positive but weak.  It may be the case that, even 
when controlling for income, remittances have a small effect on increasing health expenditures, 
but it appears more likely that households spend on health when they feel it is necessary, 
regardless of how the income was earned. 
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Table 40  
Significant Effects across Models 
  School Vices    Luxury   Home 
Production  
Grocery 
Store 
Purchases 
Water Electricity      Home 
Maintenance         
Health Donation         
OLS  + -  + - - -  + + 
Two-Part 
Fractional 
Response 
Participation + -  +  -  + + + 
Conditional + -  + - - -   - 
 Total 
(absolute 
value > .01) 
+   + -      
Two-Part 
Fractional 
Response-
Endogenous 
Participation  + + +   +   + 
 Conditional   + + -  -    
 Total 
(absolute 
value >.01) 
+  + + - + -  +  
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Given the effects of remittances on expense allocation, changes in the costs of 
transferring funds produce important policy implications.  Discussions of policy changes 
involving remittances often follow two different paths.  Scholars with organizations such as the 
World Bank are often searching for means of transferring money that would reduce the cost of 
transfers, thus providing the recipient with a larger portion of what the sender remits.  Policy-
makers in recipient countries, however, may look to tax remittances as a means of increasing 
revenue, thereby reducing the amount that recipients would receive, ceteris paribus.  The effects 
of remittances on labor supply and consumption decisions, therefore, are important for inclusion 
in this increasingly important debate.   
In the first essay, we conclude that remittances negatively affect labor participation for 
some groups while positively affect hours worked for others, although most of these effects are 
small.  Policies that reduce a household’s net remittances, therefore, may increase labor force 
participation for some while simultaneously reducing the hours worked of others.  In the second 
essay, we find that certain expense categories, such as schooling and health-related expenses, are 
positively but weakly affected by increased reliance on remittances.  Policies that increase the 
net remittances received, such as those aimed at decreasing costs charged by transferring 
agencies (usually by increasing information about the costs of each transferring firm), may 
increase household expenditures on items that will improve a developing country’s long-run 
economic prospects.  Of course, reliance on remittances also increases home production, which 
may negatively affect economic growth, so the picture painted by the expenditure findings is not 
clear cut. 
Overall, many of the findings, while significant, are small in magnitude, and thus policy 
recommendations are not always obvious.  Individuals interested in changing such policies, 
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therefore, are urged to conduct additional research and consider country-specific effects that may 
differ from those in this paper.  Most apparent from this research, however, is that policy-makers 
must consider both the effects of remittances on the labor market and household consumption 
before making major changes that regulate or affect this financial flow. 
There are important implications for this research as well.  It appears remittances are used 
for education (when we consider the magnitude of the total effect in the instrumental approach) 
and to support subsistence farming, two facets with different implications for a developing 
economy.  The fact that remittances may increase spending on education, ceteris paribus, is a 
positive sign.  Domestic policies in Jamaica may not want to restrict or decrease the flow of 
funds by trying to tax this income stream.  There is a greater chance that this money is used for 
educational purposes than an earned wage.  At the same time, remittances seem to subsidize 
home production.  We cannot determine, however, whether home production arises out of a need 
from a lack of jobs or is seen as a preferred career path with fewer hours worked and no boss to 
whom one must report.  It could be the case, however, that the subsidizing of subsistence 
farming is reducing work effort, hence moving the country away from its potential GDP. 
 Regardless of whether one views the net effect of reliance on remittances as a positive or 
negative for a household in a developing country, one important fact emerges that ties this paper 
together.  The source of income matters.  The earlier part of this paper compared the traditional 
life cycle hypothesis to more recent developments in behavioral life cycle theory.  Whether the 
result of expectations by the sender or different preferences by the recipient, we find that even 
when controlling for total expenditures, reliance on remittances appears to have a moderate 
effect on household allocation.  We cannot dismiss the idea that preferences are identical because 
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of stipulations set by senders, but this essay nonetheless provides evidence as to the behavioral 
differences that exist in the spending of earned versus unearned income. 
 
Appendix 
Table 41   
Married Males First-stage Results 
 Wage Remittance Husband’s Education 
Work Experience  -0.006*** -0.022*** 0.017*** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) 
Average Remittances in 
District (in  USD ‘000S) 
0.008 0.713*** 0.023 
 (0.006) (0.111) (0.033) 
Wife’s Education 
(Highest Degree) 
0.017*** -0.011 0.390*** 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.032) 
Other Kid's 5 and under -0.009 0.129*** -0.081*** 
 (0.011) (0.044) (0.031) 
Other Kid's 6 and Over 0.010 0.160*** -0.020 
 (0.007) (0.048) (0.021) 
Property Income  0.005** -0.001 0.007 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
HH's Kids 5 and under -0.015* 0.048 0.029 
 (0.009) (0.041) (0.043) 
HH's Kids 6 and over -0.006 0.025 -0.074*** 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.018) 
Wife’s Age 0.005*** -0.004 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Wife’s Age Squared -0.000*** 0.000* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
_cons -0.053 -0.028 0.179 
 (0.048) (0.231) (0.201) 
Year and Parish Control YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.08 0.14 0.24 
N 5,533 5,533 5,533 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
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Table 42   
Single Women First-stage 
 Wage Remittance Female's Education 
Work Experience  -0.010*** -0.017*** 0.043*** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) 
Average Remittances in 
District (in  USD ‘000S) 
0.007* 0.807*** 0.070** 
 (0.004) (0.061) (0.030) 
Oldest Child’s Education 
(Highest Degree) 
0.004** -0.001 0.206*** 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.027) 
Other Kid's 5 and under -0.023*** 0.024 -0.154*** 
 (0.008) (0.042) (0.033) 
Other Kid's 6 and Over -0.018*** 0.138*** -0.088*** 
 (0.005) (0.028) (0.019) 
Property Income  0.014*** -0.005 0.037*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.014) 
HH's Kids 5 and under 0.007 0.206*** -0.135*** 
 (0.007) (0.073) (0.048) 
HH's Kids 6 and over -0.006 0.045* -0.180*** 
 (0.004) (0.026) (0.023) 
Wife’s Age -0.000 -0.001 -0.015* 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.008) 
Wife’s Age Squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
_cons 0.043 0.054 1.049*** 
 (0.027) (0.237) (0.258) 
Year and Parish Control YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.11 0.13 0.13 
N 6,297 6,297 6,297 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
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Table 43   
Single Males- First-stage Results 
 Wage Remittance Male's Education 
Work Experience  -0.009*** -0.022*** 0.010** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) 
Average Remittances in District 
(in  USD ‘000S) 
0.001 0.329*** 0.089* 
 (0.007) (0.045) (0.046) 
Oldest Child’s Education 
(Highest Degree) 
0.008** 0.068 0.158*** 
 (0.004) (0.073) (0.058) 
Other Kid's 5 and under 0.021 0.126 -0.112 
 (0.026) (0.123) (0.080) 
Other Kid's 6 and Over -0.020 0.447*** 0.073 
 (0.024) (0.085) (0.049) 
Property Income  0.008*** 0.011 0.018 
 (0.003) (0.015) (0.020) 
HH's Kids 5 and under -0.010 -0.021 -0.106 
 (0.059) (0.096) (0.118) 
HH's Kids 6 and over 0.036*** 0.152** -0.041 
 (0.013) (0.062) (0.045) 
Wife’s Age -0.003*** -0.003 -0.007** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) 
Wife’s Age Squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
_cons 0.116*** 0.345** 0.776*** 
 (0.037) (0.166) (0.204) 
Year and Parish Control YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.09 0.06 0.06 
N 3,550 3,550 3,550 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (Std. Error in parentheses) 
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Table 44   
Contents of STATIN's Consumption Aggregate Dataset (Slightly Modified) 
VARIABLE NAME DESCRIPTION 
SERIAL  Household Identification 
PARISH Parish Number 
CONST Constituency Number 
DISTRICT  Enumeration District Number 
EDWGHT Non-Response Weight For Ed 
DWELLING Dwelling Number 
HH Household Number in Dwelling 
SCHOOL Annual Education Spending 
HEALTH Annual Spending On Health Care And Medicines 
TOBACCO  Annual Spending On Tobacco Related Products 
GAMBLING  Annual Gambling Spending 
DONATION Annual Amounts Donated 
SALON Annual Amounts Spent On Hair Salon Visits And Hair Products 
GROCERY Annual Value Of Purchased Food Expenses 
T_MEAL Annual Purchased Meal Expenditure 
TOT_WAT Annual Water Bill 
ELECTRIC Annual Electricity Bill 
TOT_TELE Annual Telephone Bill 
HOMEPROD Annual Value Of Home Produced And Gift Food 
UTILITY Annual Utility Bill (Tot_Wat + Electric + Tot_Tele) 
HHEXP Household Operational Expenditures 
HOUSING Annual Housing Expenditure 
(Rent+Tot_Mort+Tot_Tax+Utility+HHEXP) 
TOT_FOOD Annual Food Expenditure (Grocery+ T_Meal + Homeprod) 
TOT_EXPENDITURE School+Tot_Food+Tot_Wat+Electric+Hhexp+Health+Tobacco+Ga
mbling+Donation+Salon 
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Table 45   
Items in Consumption Categories for the Second Essay 
Grocery Store Purchases: 
Fresh or frozen beef 
Fresh or frozen pork 
Fresh or frozen mutton 
Offal – heart, kidney, liver, tripe, etc. 
Oxtail, trotters, cow’s foot, hocks 
Salted, cured, or canned meat (e.g. pigtail) 
Fresh or frozen fish 
Salted codfish 
Canned mackerel, sardines, herring 
Other salted or canned fish and shellfish 
Fresh or frozen whole chicken or parts 
Chicken neck or back 
Other poultry – fresh, frozen salted, cured, or canned 
Rice 
Cornmeal 
Dried peas and beans 
Breakfast cereals 
Yams 
Irish potatoes 
Cassava, coco, sweet potatoes, dasheen 
Plantains, green bananas, breadfruit  
Fresh vegetables 
Frozen, canned, and dried vegetables 
Ackee 
Fruit and vegetable  juices (fresh or frozen) 
Fresh fruit 
Canned and dried fruits 
Sugar 
Honey, sweeteners, jams, jellies 
Soups 
Prepared meats and fish 
Dry, packaged foods 
Powders, flavoring and extracts 
Sauces and relishes 
Condiments 
Nuts 
Baby Food 
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Other food (chips, snacks, etc.) 
Breakfast drinks 
Non-alcoholic beverages 
Alcoholic beverages 
School expenses: 
Exam Fees 
Tuition Fees 
Other School Fees 
Extra Lessons / Tutorials 
Transportation 
School Lunches 
Uniforms 
Books 
Other Supplies 
Boarding 
  
Daily Food 
Meat, poultry, or fish meals bought away from home (including gifts) 
Sandwiches, Burgers, and Patties 
Dairy Products (e.g. milk, Supligen, Nutrament, etc.) 
Breakfast beverages (e.g. tea, coffee, milo, etc.) 
Fruits, juices, and vegetables 
Drinks- boxes, bottles, etc. 
Others- eg. Soups, vegetarian meals, etc. 
  
Non-food Consumption: 
Soap, toothpaste/brushes, shaving cream, razors and blades 
Cosmetics 
Hair and body care 
Laundry supplies 
Polishes, waxes, air fresheners, insect repellants 
Kitchen supplies 
Toilet supplies 
Other household supplies 
Home help services 
Laundry and dry cleaning services 
Rental of equipment 
Cooking gas 
Furniture indoor 
Furniture, outdoor 
Other furnishings 
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Dinnerware 
Cookware 
Other small kitchen appliances 
Large kitchen appliances 
Radio, TV, VC, DVD, CD player, component set, computer, printer, and fax 
Other small household equipment 
Repairs on furniture of household equipment 
Medicines 
Medical services 
Health insurance 
Shoes and sandals for adults 
Shoes and sandals for children 
Clothing material for adults 
Adult clothing 
Children’s clothing 
Making and repair of clothes 
Accessories 
Reading materials 
Stationary and writing equipment 
Sporting activities (e.g. club membership) 
Other recreational activities  
Purchased transportation (taxi, bus, car) 
Gasoline, motor oil, diesel 
Car/ motor cycle repair, tires, motor parts 
Car, motor cycle, insurance 
Vehicle taxes, duties 
Purchase of car, motor cycles for personal use 
Other transport expenses 
Vacation expenses 
Gardening and horticulture 
Telephone 
Other consumption expenditures 
Purchases for special occasions. 
Non consumption expenditures: 
Life and general insurance 
Horse racing 
Other gambling 
Weddings, funerals 
Donations / gifts 
Loan repayment 
Support of children living elsewhere 
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Support of other relatives living elsewhere 
National housing trust 
National insurance scheme 
Pension contributions 
Other non-consumption expenditures 
Direct taxes 
 
 
Table 46  
 Checking the Performance of the Instrument 
Variable Correlation with district level 
remittances 
Remittance Share (Endogenous?) Yes 
School None 
Vices    None 
Water None 
  Health None  
Donation         None 
Luxury   Yes 
Home Production  Yes 
Grocery Store Purchases Share Yes 
Electricity      Yes 
Home Maintenance         Yes 
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Table 47   
Outliers in the Consumption Chapter 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max % Dropped 
After outliers are dropped 
School  18,329 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.58 -0.53% 
Vices* 12,006 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.18 -4.53% 
Luxury* 18,029 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.58 -2.15% 
Home 
Production 
17,842 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.32 -3.17% 
All other 
foods 
18,426 0.51 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.00% 
Water 18,072 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.14 -1.92% 
Electricity 18,022 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.30 -2.19% 
Home 
Maintenance 
17,732 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.18 -3.77% 
Health 14001 0.01565 0.04139 0 0.2433002 -3.01% 
Donation 12,272 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.10 -2.42% 
Total 
Expenditure 
18,277 3,477.17 2,323.07 0.00 14,001.24 -0.83% 
Remittances 
Share 
17,952 0.13 0.26 0.00 1.65 -1.81% 
Labor Share 15,369 0.93 1.37 0.00 8.70 -0.90% 
Before outliers are dropped 
School  18,426 0.10 0.14 0.00 1.00  
Vices* 12,576 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.91  
Luxury* 18,426 0.16 0.16 0.00 1.00  
Home 
Production 
18,426 0.07 0.11 0.00 1.00  
All other 
foods 
18,426 0.51 0.19 0.00 1.00  
Water 18,426 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.71  
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Electricity 18,426 0.08 0.08 0.00 1.00  
Home 
Maintenance 
18,426 0.02 0.07 0.00 1.00  
Health 14,436 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.92  
Donation 12,576 0.01 0.04 0.00 1.00  
Total 
Expenditure 
18,430 3,609.25 2,927.98 0.00 143,836.30  
Remittances 
Share 
18,282 0.18 0.60 0.00 22.82  
Labor Share 15,509 1.07 2.45 0.00 136.71  
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